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The Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989:
Disenfranchising Shareholders in Order
to Protect Them
Jayne W. Barnard*
On May 2, 1988, then Chairman David S. Ruder of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced the Commission's support
for legislation which would specifically authorize federal courts, and in
certain circumstances the SEC itself, to bar corporate officers and direc-
tors found to have violated the securities laws from assuming any future
managerial role in a public company.I This announcement followed the
recommendation of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial
Reporting (the Treadway Commission) several months earlier that "the
SEC should seek explicit statutory authority to bar or suspend corporate
officers and directors involved in fraudulent financial reporting from fu-
ture service in that capacity in a public company." 2
For some time the SEC staff had resisted this recommendation on
the ground that the Commission was already empowered to seek, and in
fact had successfully obtained, bar or suspension orders as ancillary relief
in proceedings seeking primary injunctive relief.3 In addition, the SEC
had itself entered such orders in SEC administrative compliance
proceedings. 4
The staff's concern was that specific congressional action, such as
that recommended by the Treadway Commission, might suggest to a fed-
eral district court a limitation on the SEC's ability to obtain other types of
ancillary relief in litigated proceedings, such as the appointment of a re-
ceiver or the imposition of restitutional orders. 5 In addition, there was
some concern that the Treadway Commission's recommendation did not
go far enough in that its proposal would provide for bar or suspension
orders only in cases involving fraudulent financial reporting, but not in-
volving other forms of securities laws violations, such as insider trading,
* B.S. University of Illinois; J.D. University of Chicago; Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-
Wythe School of Law, College of William & Mary. I am grateful to Marc Steinberg for his comments
on an earlier draft of this article, and to Richard Williamson, Charles Koch,John Tucker and Steven
Glynn for additional suggestions. Philip C. SessomsJr.,James Anastos and Daniel Bennett assisted
with research.
1 Statement of David S. Ruder, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission Before
the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and Com-
merce Concerning the Recommendations of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Re-
porting, at 27-28 (on file at the Notre Dame Law Review).
2 Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 66 (October 1987).
The Commission was headed by former SEC CommissionerJames C. Treadway, who for some time
has advocated that the SEC seek and exercise authority to suspend and bar executives. See SEC
Should Have Power to Bar Executives for Secutities Violations, TreadwaY SaYs, 16 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
1487 (Sept. 14, 1984).
3 See inra notes 56-66, 69-71, 158 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
5 Statement of Chairman Ruder, supra note 1 at 27.
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market manipulation or disregard of the proxy or tender offer rules.
Moreover, argued SEC General Counsel Daniel Goelzer, seeking con-
gressional approval of bar and suspension authority would be "contro-
versial,"' 6 presumably inviting the negative response of such powerful
groups as the Business Roundtable, which has repeatedly opposed ef-
forts to curb managerial autonomy.7
In ultimately embracing the recommendation of the Treadway Com-
mission, the SEC responded to most of the staff's concerns. In his testi-
mony, Chairman Ruder urged Congress to make clear that a specific
grant of authority to seek bar or suspension orders in litigated proceed-
ings was not exclusive, and ought not serve to preclude other types of
ancillary relief. He also requested that authority to seek bar or suspen-
sion orders be extended to apply to any violation of the federal securities
laws. 8
On February 9, 1989, in response to the SEC's request, Representa-
tiveJohn Dingell (D-Mich.), Chairman of the House Energy & Commerce
Committee, introduced the Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of
1989 ("The Remedies Act") in the House of Representatives.9 On
March 17, 1989, Senator Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.), Chairman of the
Senate Securities Subcommittee, introduced an identical bill in the
Senate.10
The Remedies Act seeks to amend sections 20(b) of the Securities
Act of 193311 and 21(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193412 (those
provisions authorizing the SEC to bring civil actions against alleged
wrongdoers) as follows:
In any proceeding under this subsection, the court may prohibit, con-
ditionally or unconditionally, either permanently or for such period of
time as it shall determine, any person found to have violated any pro-
vision of this title or any rule or regulation thereunder from acting as
an officer or director of any issuer that has a class of securities regis-
tered pursuant to section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(15 U.S.C. 78) or that is required to file reports pursuant to subsec-
tion (d) of Section 15 of such Act (15 U.S.C. 78o).'3
6 SEC to Ask Congressfor Power to Inpose Civil Monetay Fines, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 635
(April 29, 1988).
7 E.g., Statement of the Business Roundtable on the American Law Institute's Proposed "Prin-
ciples of Corporate Governance and Structure: Restatement and Recommendations," February
1983; Pratt, The ALI Corporate Governance Project: A Radical Cure for a Healthy Patient (National
Legal Center White Paper) March 1, 1989.
8 Statement of Chairman Ruder, supra note 1, at 27.
9 H.R. 975, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 135 CONG. REC. H272 (1989).
10 S. 647, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S3046-50 (1989).
11 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1988).
12 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1988).
13 H.R. 975,supra note 9, § I01 (amending the 1933 Act); § 202 (amending the 1934 Act). Issu-
ers are required to register under § 12 of the Exchange Act where they are engaged in interstate
commerce or their securities are traded by use of the mails or wire and where their total corporate
assets are valued at $5 million or more. 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1988) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-I (1988).
They must file reports under § 15 of the Act where they have at least 300 shareholders, have had a
registration statement become effective under the 1933 Act and are not subject to 15 U.S.C. § 781.
15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1988).
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The bill also provides that the SEC may, in an administrative compli-
ance action under section 15(c)(4) of the Exchange Act, 14 enter its own
bar or suspension order against "any person found to have failed to com-
ply, or to have been a cause of the failure to comply" with sections 12,
13, 15(d) or 16(a) of the Act, where the Commission finds that such an
order is "in the public interest."1 5 The order may be conditional or un-
conditional, and either permanent or "for such period of time as [the
Commission] shall determine." 16
This Article explores the various suspension and bar powers em-
braced by The Remedies Act. 17 Under existing law, a corporate execu-
tive who violates one or more provisions of the federal securities laws is
subject to entry of an injunction against further violations, together with
attendant corrective orders.' 8 He may be sued for civil damages by a
person injured by his acts. Where his conduct has been "willful," he may
also be subject to criminal prosecution.' 9 The Remedies Act now adds
several additional options: removal from (a specific) office, suspension
from office, lifetime disqualification from office, and either temporary or
permanent disqualification from similar offices in any public company
(the "comprehensive suspension or bar").
The thesis of this Article is that, notwithstanding persuasive argu-
ments against The Remedies Act, court-ordered removal and suspension
from a specific office and related functions within a company for a defi-
nite term is a sound and well-established means of dealing with fiduciary
misconduct. The extended-term or lifetime disqualification from a par-
ticular corporate office should be sparingly sought and imposed, but may
be supported by an appropriate evidentiary foundation.
By contrast, the comprehensive bar can never be justified as a matter
of evidence, is unnecessary to effective law enforcement and is a poor
choice as public policy. Moreover, permitting the SEC, as opposed to
the federal district courts, to compel removal or disqualification of cor-
porate officers and directors-either in a corporation-specific context or
with a comprehensive order-would grant the Commission unwarranted
power and would distort its proper role in maintaining the integrity of
the capital markets.
Overview
The Article first explores the SEC's experience in seeking judicially-
imposed executive suspension or bar orders in the absence of express
congressional authority, and the extent to which the doctrine of ancillary
relief may permit such orders. The Article reviews the congressionally-
authorized use of removal, suspension and bar orders against fiduciaries
14 15 U.S.C. 78o(c)(4) (1988).
15 H.R. 975, supra note 9, § 201.
16 Id.
17 The Remedies Act also includes an authorization for general civil penalties in both litigated
and administrative proceedings and amendments to the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940. These provisions are not discussed in this Article.
18 See infra notes 51-63 and accompanying text.
19 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1988).
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in contexts other than securities regulation (such as banking,20 thrift
management, 2 1 mutual fund management 22 and the management of la-
bor unions and employee benefit plans2 3), demonstrating that Congress
has not been reluctant to authorize removal, suspension and bar powers
in situations comparable to those involving executive misconduct.
The Article then examines the desirability of court-imposed removal
and suspension orders in a corporation-specific context, considering
whether such orders impermissibly interfere with corporations' internal
affairs and result in a taking of shareholders' rights without due pro-
cess. 24 Assuming these problems can be overcome, we will then focus
on the appropriate duration of an executive suspension order, 25 and a
functional definition of "officer or director" which will ensure that sus-
pension orders are neither overly broad (by prohibiting the performance
of necessary managerial functions) nor overly narrow (by failing to in-
hibit wrongful conduct).2 6
Part II examines the more controversial notion of the "comprehen-
sive bar," or disqualification from service in any public company (as op-
posed to the specific company in which misconduct has occurred). Both
the SEC and the Department of Labor 2 7 have argued that an order com-
prehensively barring a person from serving anywhere within a broad uni-
verse of potential employers for some period of time, or perhaps in
perpetuity, may be a necessary and appropriate means of aiding those
agencies' law enforcement goals. However, in considering the propriety
of a bar as broad as that comprehended by The Remedies Act (one which
would bar access to managerial functions wholly unrelated to financial
reporting and disclosure to shareholders), one must consider whether
Congress really wishes to impose "merit regulation" on corporate of-
ficers and directors, 28 whether the comprehensive bar is unnecessarily
disproportionate to the underlying misconduct and/or irretrievable to a
degree which is inconsistent with due process, 2 - and whether the bar is
inconsistent with fundamental principles of corporate disclosure and
shareholder suffrage.3 0
Part III examines the special problems presented by that portion of
The Remedies Act which would empower the SEC itself to disqualify cor-
porate executives from future executive employment. These problems
include issues of adjudicatory competence, potential for abuse of discre-
tion and the question of whether the suspension and bar power permits
the SEC to "punish" individuals (which is constitutionally impermissible
20 See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
21 See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
22 See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
23 See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 180-87 and accompanying text.
29 See i'fra notes 199-206 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 95-96, 214-16 and accompanying text.
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for a regulatory agency) 3 1 or merely to regulate their conduct. Part III
focuses especially on the question of whether it is appropriate as a matter
of public policy to empower the SEC to interfere with corporate govern-
ance as broadly as is contemplated in The Remedies Act.
Congress is not alone in dealing with the question of whether, and
under what circumstances, it may be appropriate to suspend or bar cor-
porate fiduciaries from the market for managerial labor. Part IV of this
Article examines the experience of United Kingdom executives under the
Company Directors Disqualification Act of 198632 and its predecessors,
which have taken a much more intrusive approach to executive bar and
suspension powers than that comprehended in The Remedies Act. Part
V concludes with a proposed alternative to the bill.
I. Corporation-Specific Removal "for Cause"
It has long been understood that corporate directors may be re-
moved from their positions by the shareholders "for cause," and that
corporate officers, like other employees, may similarly be removed by the
directors "for cause."3 3 The grounds for such dismissals have varied:
malfeasance or misconduct in office, inflexible discord on major policy
issues, disobedience of board directives, harassment and uncooperative-
ness in the transaction of corporate business, misapplication of funds,
neglect or incompetency. 34 Other grounds may exist, such as conduct
disabling the corporation from receiving licensure, 35 entering into a
competitive business 3 6 or physical or mental incapacitation. The com-
mon denominator of "for cause" removals by shareholders is some form
31 See infra notes 295-70 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 291-304 and accompanying text.
33 In many states, and in corporations whose articles or bylaws so permit, removal may also be
without cause. REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 8.08(a) (1984) ("The shareholders may remove
one or more directors with or without cause unless the articles of incorporation provide that direc-
tors may be removed only for cause."); § 8.43(b) ("A board of directors may remove any officer at
any time with or without cause.").
34 E.g., NAACP of Houston Metropolitan Council v. NAACP, 460 F. Supp. 583 (S.D. Tex. 1978)
(board may remove local Executive Secretary where he failed to develop organization's membership,
behaved in a "dictatorial" fashion and was responsible for certain "irregular financial transactions");
Central Alaska Broadcasting, Inc. v. Bracale, 637 P.2d 711 (Alaska 1981) (board may discharge sta-
tion general manager where he refused to fire an employee at the board's direction); Grace v. Grace
Inst., 19 N.Y.2d 307, 226 N.E.2d 531, 279 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1967) (board may remove one of its mem-
bers where he has engaged in repeated and unsuccessful litigation against the corporation); Thisted
v. Tower Management Corp., 147 Mont. 1,409 P.2d 813 (1966) (director may be removed from the
board where he has threatened to sue shareholders if they interfere with his decisions to remodel
corporate property and "walked out" of meetings called to permit him to explain corporate plans);
Morton v. E-Z Rake, Inc., 397 N.E.2d 609 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (board may discharge Executive Vice-
President where he failed to obey a direct order to pay certain claims); Ross v. 311 North Cent. Ave.
Bldg. Corp., 130 Ill. App. 2d 336, 264 N.E.2d 406 (1970) (minority shareholders may remove of-
ficers who loaned corporate funds to another corporation controlled by them, without adequate
security, rather than paying a dividend); Brown v. North Ventura Rd. Dev. Co., 216 Cal. App. 2d
227, 30 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1963) (Chairman of the Board may be removed where he has mismanaged a
major project).
35 Cf. Cooke v. Teleprompter Corp., 334 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (shareholders could rea-
sonably conclude that CEO who has been convicted of bribery in the solicitation of cable franchises
should be removed, lest other communities "have some reticence in dealing with" the company or
"be tempted by knowledge of the conviction to exert extortionate pressures" on the company).
36 E.g., Eckhaus v. Ma, 635 F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (discharged officer may be removed
from the board for cause where he has undertaken employment with corporation's competitor); Wil-
[Vol. 65:32
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of executive conduct injurious or potentially injurious to the sound gov-
ernance of the corporation, and ultimately to its share value.
Congress has recognized the need to ensure the swift removal of
corporate executives and other fiduciaries in situations comparable to
the "for cause" circumstances justifying removal by shareholders, where
other constituents are at risk. For example, Congress has provided that
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation may summarily suspend from
office an indicted official of a federally-insured bank if his or her contin-
ued service "may pose a threat to the interests of the bank's depositors
or threatens to impair public confidence in the bank"3 7 or an unindicted
official who has engaged or participated in any unsafe or unsound prac-
tice in connection with the bank.38 Congress has dealt in a similar way
with directors of savings and loan associations, who may be removed
from office by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board when they have en-
gaged in a breach of fiduciary duty leading to substantial financial loss.39
Fund managers under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) may be removed by a federal district court where it is shown
that they have violated their statutory fiduciary duties,40 and mutual fund
managers (and officers or directors of corporate mutual fund managers)
may be removed by a federal district court where it is shown that they
liams v. Queen Fisheries, Inc., 2 Wash. App. 691, 469 P.2d 583 (1970) (president may be removed
where he misappropriated Queen's equipment and employees to run a competing business).
37 12 U.S.C. § 18 18 (g)(1) (1988), upheld in FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230 (1988).
38 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(1) (1988) ("Whenever, in the opinion of the appropriate Federal banking
agency, any director or officer of an insured bank has committed any violation of law, rule, or regula-
tion or of a cease-and-desist order which has become final, or has engaged or participated in any
unsafe or unsound practice in connection with the bank, or has committed or engaged in anv, act,
omission, or practice which constitutes a breach of his fiduciary duty as such director or officer, and
the agency determines that the bank has suffered or will probably suffer substantial financial loss or
other damage or that the interests of its depositors could be seriously prejudiced by reason of such
violation or practice or breach of fiduciary duty or that the director or office[r] has received financial
gain by reason of such violation or practice or breach of fiduciary duty, and that such violation or
practice or breach of fiduciary duty is one involving personal dishonesty on the part of such director
or officer, or one which demonstrates a willful or continuing disregard for the safety or soundness of
the bank, the agency may serve upon such director or officer a written notice of its intention to
remove him from office.").
39 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(4)(A) (1988) ("Whenever, in the opinion of the Board, any director or
officer of an association has committed any violation of law, rule, or regulation or of a cease-and-
desist order which has become final, or has engaged or participated in any unsafe or unsound prac-
tice in connection with the association, or has committed or engaged in any act, omission, or practice
which constitutes a breach of his fiduciary duty as such director or officer, and the Board determines
that the association has suffered or will probably suffer substantial financial loss or other damage or
that the interests of its savings account holders could be seriously prejudiced by reason of such
violation or practice or breach of fiduciary duty, or that the director or officer has received financial
gain by reason of such violation or practice or breach of fiduciary duty, and that such violation or
practice or breach of fiduciary duty is one involving personal dishonesty on the part of such director
or officer, or a willful or continuing disregard for the safety or soundness of the association, the
Board may serve upon such director or officer a written notice of its intention to remove him from
office or to prohibit his further participation in any manner in the conduct of the affairs of the
association.").
40 29 U.S.C. § I109(a) (1982) (Fiduciaries may be required "to make good to such plan any
losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such
fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be
subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including
removal of such fiduciary.").
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have engaged in any act or practice constituting a breach of fiduciary
duty involving personal misconduct. 4'
Securities brokers and officers or directors of brokerage houses may
be suspended or barred by the SEC where they have willfully violated any
provision of the federal securities laws 4 2 or where a trustee has been ap-
pointed under the Securities Investor Protection Act.43 Investment ad-
visers and mutual fund managers may be suspended or barred by the
SEC where they are found to have willfully made fraudulent public state-
ments concerning securities. 44
Even in fields not expressly regulated under federal law, executives
and others may be required "to divest [themselves] of any interest, direct'
or indirect, in any enterprise," 45 and a district court in a civil action may
impose "reasonable restrictions on [their] future activities or invest-
ments ' 46 in order to prevent violations of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).4 7
A persuasive argument emerges from the foregoing enumeration of
some of the situations in which Congress has explicitly authorized re-
moval or suspension orders against managerial personnel - (1) Con-
gress knows how to provide such authorization where it wishes to do so;
(2) it is reasonable to assume that, having failed to do so with respect to
corporate directors and officers in either the Securities Act of 193348 or
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 49 Congress did not intend to em-
power the SEC to pursue such orders in court or elsewhere but rather to
limit the SEC's authority to the statutorily-enumerated remedies;5'" and
therefore (3) the SEC lacks inherent authority to seek removal or suspen-
sion orders in the absence of specific congressional authorization, such
as that proposed in The Remedies Act.
A. Removal and Suspension as Ancilla~y Relief
The response to the strict statutory construction argument has been
rooted in broad notions of equity. The SEC has long enjoyed express
authority to seek an injunction where it believes that any person "is en-
gaged or [is] about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or
will constitute a violation" of the securities acts. 5 ' With this power, the
SEC has successfully sought court orders enjoining the offer and sale of
41 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1988).
42 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(D) (1988).
43 15 U.S.C. § 78jij(b) (1988).
44 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e) (1988); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(b) (1988).
45 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1988).
46 Id.
47 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988).
48 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (1988).
49 15 U.S.C. § 78a-7811 (1988).
50 See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
51 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1988) (Securities Act of 1933); 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1988) (Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934); 15 U.S.C. § 79r(e) (1988) (Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935); 15
U.S.C. § 80a-41(d) (1988) (Investment Company Act of 1940); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(d) (1988) (Invest-
ment Advisers' Act of 1940).
[Vol. 65:32
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certain investment instruments, 52 the offer and sale of any investment
instruments in violation of the law, 53 and any future violation of specified
provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.54
Courts of equity must have flexibility in tailoring injunctions so as to
prevent and deter future unlawful conduct. It is seldom sufficient for a
court merely to prohibit the precise misconduct which has led a defend-
ant into court.55 Rather, various "ancillary remedies" have developed
over time which aid the court in its efforts to effectively terminate or in-
terdict misconduct.56 These remedies may supplement or replace the
injunction,57 and may include affirmative orders to undertake specific
corrective corporate activities, 58 restitution or disgorgement orders, 59
the appointment of a receiver to oversee corporate operations, 60 orders
freezing the defendants' assets, 6' and orders staying related state court
litigation.62 The SEC has regularly argued that an additional ancillary
remedy in this arsenal is the court-ordered removal and suspension of
named corporate executives from continuing service on behalf of the
corporation in which misconduct occurred. (Occasionally, the SEC has
52 E.g., SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Ent., Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821
(1973).
53 E.g., SEC v. Carriba Air, Inc., 681 F.2d 1318 (11th Cir. 1982).
54 E.g., SEC v. Champion Sports Management, Inc., 599 F. Stipp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); SEC v.
Dimensional Entertainment Corp., 518 F. Supp. 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); SEC v. Kalvex, Inc., 425 F.
Supp. 310, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
55 United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 727 (1944) ("Of course, a mere
prohibition of the precise scheme would be ineffectual to prevent [the wrong complained of]").
56 See generally Dent, Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Lawi: A Study in Federal Remedies, 67 MINN. L.
REV. 865 (1983); Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1779
(1976); Malley, Far-Reaching Equitable Remedies Under the Secnrities 4cs and the Growth of Federal Coiporate
Law, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 47 (1975); Treadway, SEC Enforcenent Techniques: Expanding and Exotic
Forns ofAncillary Relief, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 637 (1975); Comment, Equitable Remedies in SEC
Enforcement Actions, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1188 (1975); Note, Ancillary Relief in SEC hjunction Suits for
'iolation of Rule lOb-5, 79 HARV. L. REV. 656 (1966).
57 See Comment, supra note 56, at 1191-92 (discussing Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Air-
craft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), -ert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973), in which the court awarded
rescission even in the absence of an injunction).
58 E.g., SEC v. Waco Financial, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 651 (W.D. Mich. 1981) (defendant cannot
effect any transactions in securities until it complies with Section 15(b)(7) of the Exchange Act), aff'd
751 F.2d 831 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 818 (1985); See also SEC v. Teleprompter Corp., SEC
Lit. Rel. 6431 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (defendant consents to adopting new financial monitoring practices);
SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,556
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (defendant consents to substantial change in policy regarding investigation and
sales of commercial paper).
59 E.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104 (2d Cir. 1972) (approving district
court injunction requiring defendants to disgorge the proceeds received in connection with an un-
lawful securities offering).
60 E.g., id. at 1105 (approving appointment of a "trustee" to receive and distribute funds to
plaintiff shareholders); SEC v. S & P Nat'l Corp., 360 F.2d 741, 751 (2d Cir. 1966) (approving ap-
pointment of receiver to " 'ascertain the true state of affairs ... and report thereon' to the court and
public shareholders and preserve the corporate assets" pending a decision on whether to liquidate
the company); Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortg. Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960) (ap-
proving appointment of a receiver pendente life), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961); SEC v. Investors
Sec. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 745 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (recounting the appointment of a receiver); SEC v.
H.S. Simmons & Co., 190 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (appointing a receiver).
61 E.g., SEC v. Paro, 468 F. Supp. 635, 651 (N.D.N.Y. 1979) (preliminarily enjoining the transfer
of assets except as necessary to the continuation of the defendants' legal business operations);
Manor Nursing Ctrs., 458 F.2d at 1106 (approving order temporarily freezing defendants' assets to
limit waste prior to refunding public investors' money).
62 SEC v. Wencke, 577 F.2d 619 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 964 (1978).
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additionally sought the appointment of interim "independent"
replacements) 63
For example, in SEC v. Florafax International, Inc.,64 the SEC sought
injunctive relief against a corporation and two of its executives, claiming
repeated violations of the accounting and financial reporting require-
ments of sections 13(a) and (b) of the Exchange Act.6 5 The SEC sought
(and ultimately secured through entry of a consent decree) an order en-
joining further violations of section 13, corrected filings of past financial
statements, the engagement of a special auditor, appointment of an audit
committee comprised of three independent directors and the removal
and suspension of the named executives for a period of three years. 66
The Supreme Court, in the context of evaluating injunctive relief
under the federal antitrust laws, has recognized that, in order to "eradi-
cate the evils of a condemned scheme," lawful as well as unlawful con-
duct may properly be enjoined. 67 "The test is whether or not the
required action reasonably tends to dissipate the [unlawful conduct] and
prevent evasions. Doubts are to 'be resolved in favor of the Government
and against the [defendants].' "68 Using solely this guide, it is entirely
likely that a court could fashion a decree in an SEC action seeking injunc-
tive relief which would incorporate an order removing and suspending a
miscreant executive from continuing service with the corporation in
which misconduct has occurred; however, none has ever done so in a
fully-litigated proceeding. Rather, the SEC has secured such orders
solely in the context of negotiated consent decrees. Many of these or-
ders require only the defendant's resignation.i '-l "Finite suspension" or-
ders prohibit the defendant from reassuming his position with the
63 E.g., SEC v. Charter Securities Management Corp., SEC Lit. Rel. 6593 (C.D. Cal. 1974); SEC
v. Charter Diversified Services, SEC Lit. Rel. 6507 (C.D. Cal. 1974); cases cited in Steinberg, The
Securities and Exchange Commission "s Admnistrative, Enforcenient, and Legislative Programs and Policies-Their
Influence on Corporate InternalAffairs, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 173, 215 n.182 (1982). But see SEC v.
Falstaff Brewing Corp., [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,583 (1978) (court
declines to appoint independent directors), aff'd, 629 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012
(1980); SEC v. American Realty Trtst, 429 F. Supp. 1148, 1177 (E.D. Va. 1977) (court declines to
remove president and appoint trustees), revTd on other grounds, 586 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1978). See
generally Note, The SEC and Court-Appointed Dhectors: Time to Tailor the Director to Fit the Suit, 60 WVAStI.
U.L.Q. 507 (1982); Comment, Court-Appointed Directors: Ancillar' Relief in Federal Secuitie.% Law Enforce-
ment Actions, 64 GEo. L.J. 737 (1976). See also Gruenbaum & Oppenheimer, Special Investigative Con-
sel: Conflicts and Roles, 33 RUTGERS L. REv. 865 (1981).
64 Complaint No. 84-C-937-B (N.D. Okla.), filed November 27, 1984.
65 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a), (b) (1988).
66 SEC v. Florafax International, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. 10,617 (N.I). Okla. 1984).
67 United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 724 (1944).
68 Id. at 726.
69 E.g., SEC v. Ministers' Investment Corp. and Glen Crowe, SEC I.it. Rel. 10,190 (W.D.Ky.
1983) (director agrees to resign from board of directors); SEC v. Jack M. Catain, Jr. and Rusco
Industries, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. 9129 (C.I).Cal. 1980) (CEO/Chairman ofthe board agrees to resign
both positions); SEC v. Westgate-California Corp.. SEC Lit. Rel. 6142 (S.D. Cal. 1973) (officers and
directors immediately resign positions with Westgate and its subsidiaries, as well as with any other
public company in which they hold a position): SEC v. Clinton Oil Co., SEC L.it. Rel. 5798 and SEC
Lit. Rel. 5713 (D. Kan. 1973) (all members of corporation's executive committee agree to resign as
officers and directors); SEC v. American Agronomics Corp., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 5667 (N.D.Ohio 1971)
(defendants agree to terminate service as officers of company).
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company for a stated period of time,70 while "lifetime disqualification"
orders prohibit the defendant from ever seeking to reassume an officer
or director position in the specific company (or complex of companies) in
which his misconduct occurred. 71
Removing and suspending a corporate executive from the corpora-
tion within which he has personally engaged in, or through which he has
orchestrated, violations of the securities laws would seem at first glance
to be little more than the flip-side of appointing a post-judgment receiver
for that corporation. The point of both orders is to permit the continua-
tion of the enterprise while ensuring compliance with the law and maxi-
mizing the likelihood that misconduct will not recur.72 Looked at in this
way, a court's authority to enter a removal and suspension order specific
to an executive's business ought not require express authorization from
Congress, any more than the appointment of a receiver requires such
authority. The court's authority to enter either order is inherent in the
court's equitable powers. 73
There are at least three reasons, however, why the forced removal
and subsequent suspension or lifetime disqualification of a corporate ex-
ecutive may differ from the judicial appointment of a post-judgment re-
ceiver, and consequently may be inappropriate as an element of ancillary
relief.
(1) A post-judgment receiver historically serves a limited function,
generally to preserve corporate property or apply it to satisfy the judg-
ment.74 Typically, the receivership is of limited duration, terminated
either by the winding up of the business or a return of the corporate
assets to their rightful owners. 75 By comparison, the removal and sus-
pension of corporate executives may last for years, if not forever, and in
any event is likely to last far longer than would a properly-administered
receivership. Moreover, such orders may result in quite different conse-
quences than would a typical receivership, including an alteration in the
long-range operational policies of the organization. 76
70 E.g., SEC v. Florafax International, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. 10,617 (N.D. Okla. 1984) (chairman
and CEO agrees to resign both positions and refrain from serving for three years); SEC v. American
Commonwealth Financial Corp., SEC Lit. Rel. 8561 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (president and director agree
to resign and refrain from serving for three years). See also SEC v. Cloyce K. Box and OKC Corp.,
SEC Lit. Rel. 9183 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (chief executive officer and director agrees to resign and not
reassume either position without further order of court); SEC v. Somatronics, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel.
7141 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (executives barred from serving as officers or directors of Somatronics without
Commission approval).
71 SEC v. Penn Central, SEC Lit. Rel. 8378 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (defendant agrees not to become a
director, officer, employee or consultant to any of the Penn Central "complex of companies").
72 Cf. Comment, supra note 56, at 1202 ("If present management cannot be trusted to comply
with an injunction, the appointment of a receiver becomes necessary to make effective the injunctive
degree and to bring a company into compliance with applicable law.").
73 SEC v. Wencke, 622 F.2d 1363, 1369 (9th Cir. 1980) ("The power of a district court to im-
pose a receivership or grant other forms of ancillary relief does not in the first instance depend on a
statutory grant of power from the securities laws. Rather, the authority derives from the inherent
power of a court of equity to fashion effective relief."). See also Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396
U.S. 375, 391 (1970) ("[W]e cannot fairly infer from the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 a purpose
to circumscribe the courts' power to grant appropriate remedies.").
74 1 R. CLARK. LAW OF RECEIVERS § 14 (1959).
75 3 R. CLARK, LAW OF RECEIVERS § 690 (1959).
76 See generally Comment, supra note 56, at 1214.
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(2) While both remedies disenfranchise shareholders, shareholders
retain more control in the case of a receivership than in the case of
forced removal of elected executives. Generally, receivers are not per-
mitted to make significant operational decisions other than those specifi-
cally entrusted to them by the court. 77 The authority to make such
decisions remains with the shareholder-selected board of directors, 78 just
as the authority to pursue derivative claims on behalf of the corporation
remains with the shareholders themselves even where the receiver ob-
jects. 79 With forced removal and subsequent suspension (and especially
where interim directors are substituted), major corporate decisions no
longer reside with the shareholder-selected board.
(3) Equity abhors a forfeiture. It may be entirely proper for a court
to impose a temporary receiver to handle certain essentially ministerial
corporate tasks, such as marshalling assets and making reports, and even
to remove a resistant executive whose presence impedes the successful
performance of the receivership, but it is quite another thing to strip a
duly-selected executive of his right to seek re-employment in his former
job once the receivership is terminated. Even a criminal conviction
under the securities laws does not disable the defendant from seeking re-
employment or re-election as a corporate director, once his period of
imprisonment has been completed.80
B. Why Removal and Suspension Orders May Not Be
Elements of Ancillary Relief
Quite apart from noting the distinction between the appointment of
a receiver and the imposition of an executive removal and suspension
order, there may be other significant objections to corporation-specific
77 A typical order appointing a receiver will enumerate the specific tasks which the receiver is to
perform. In some SEC cases, by contrast, "the receiver may be employed not simply to perform a
narrowly defined court order, but also where there has been a series of willful prior violations of the
securities laws or when present management is unresponsive, to take full control of the corporation
and direct its future operations in compliance with the securities laws as a whole." Farrand, supra
note 56, at 1788.
78 3 R. CLARK, LAW OF RECEIVERS 1319, 1422 (1959) ("The ordinary equitable appointment of a
receiver for the preservation of the assets of a company.., does not necessarily destroy the corpora-
tion nor deprive the directors of their power to act as directors of officers except it does prevent the
directors or officers interfering with the receiver's control and possession of the property committed
to him; ... [A] receiver under orders of the appointing court may even operate the property and
exercise its rights and franchises, and yet technically speaking the power of directors may not be
ousted from carrying on the internal functions of the corporation to be a corporation."). But see
Thisted v. Tower Management Corp., 409 P.2d 813, 821 (Mont. 1966) ("the district court.., has the
power to grant authority to a receiver so that he in fact replaces the board of directors and the
officers of [the company] and assumes complete control of that corporation."). Compare the role of
the bankruptcy trustee, who wholly usurps the powers of corporate directors and officers. Commod-
ity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 352-53 (1985).
79 International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334, 1352 (2d Cir.) (dictum), cert denied, 417
U.S. 932 (1974); 16 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS, § 7783.50 (1989).
80 Courts may impose as a condition of probation a prohibition against working in the enter-
prise, or in the line of work, where the defendant's misconduct occurred. See infra note 263. But this
disability only lasts as long as the prison sentence might have lasted. J. SCHEB &J. SCHEB II, CRIMI-
NAL LAW & PRACTICE at 547 (1989). In the case of securities law violations, this is ten years. 15
U.S.C. § 78ff(c) (1988).
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suspension orders as an element of injunctive relief in the absence of
express congressional authorization:
(1) Forced removal of executives is inconsistent with the legislative
history of the federal securities laws, which were specifically designed to
minimize interference with matters of corporate governance. Even its
patron, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, promised that the 1933 Act was
intended to "protect the public with the least possible interference to
honest business." 8' As one commentator has noted,
Congress [did not] intend to permit federal intrusion into corporate
governance once a corporation has violated the securities laws. If
Congress had intended such a major exception to the general rule of
noninterference in corporate governance, presumably it would have
said so, as it did in other securities laws and statutes in other areas.8 2
The primary issue is whether removal and suspension orders pre-
mised upon federal law unduly interfere with the state-supervised "inter-
nal affairs" of corporations. The Supreme Court has cautioned against
reading the federal securities laws in such a way as to "overlap and quite
possibly interfere with state corporate law." 83
There has, of course, been considerable discussion of states' rights
in the area of corporate governance, both in the context of a proposed
"federalization" of corporate law during the 1970's84 and more recently
in the debate over the propriety of state anti-takeover legislation and the
alleged preemption of such legislation by the federal Williams Act.8 5
The Supreme Court has suggested that matters of corporate governance
are better suited for regulation under state law than under federal law,8 6
and that federal laws should be narrowly construed so as not to interfere
in governance matters. s 7 This is especially true where a broad construc-
tion of federal law would inhibit the exercise of the state-established
powers of corporate directors. 8 (One commentator has suggested that,
at least in the area of corporate governance, there is a "kind of reverse
preemption" in operation, 9 by which courts are encouraged to prefer
81 S. Rep. No. 47 at 7, H.R. Rep. No. 85 at 2, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess (1933). An early draft of the
Act had expressly forbidden "the Commission to interfere with the management of the affairs of an
issuer," but that language was deleted as being unnecessary. Dent, supra note 56, at 904-05.
82 Dent, supra note 56, at 909.
83 Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977).
84 E.g., Symposium: Federal Charteing of Corporations, 61 GEO. LJ. 71 (1972).
85 E.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 86 (1987) (Indiana Control Share
Acquisitions Act is not preempted by federal law notwithstanding fact that it will delay certain tender
offers beyond the 20-business-day period permitted by the Williams Act; Court notes the "long-
standing prevalence of state regulation in this area ...").
86 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) ("Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors
commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except where federal law ex-
pressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will gov-
ern the internal affairs of the corporation.").
87 Santa Fe Industries, 430 U.S. at 479.
88 Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 480 (1979) (state law governs the power of a corporation's
disinterested directors to terminate a derivative suit, even when the basis for suit is federal law).
89 Anderson, The Meaning of Federalism: Itterpreting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 70 VA. L. REv.
813, 830 (1984).
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state law in those areas where federal and state law potentially regulate
the same conduct.90 )
The primacy of state law as it relates to corporate governance is not
wholly supported in the language of the securities laws. 9' Nor is it en-
sured by the rhetoric of the legislative history of those laws, which clearly
contemplated that some aspects of internal policy-making would be sub-
ject to federal oversight.92 All this being said, however, there is a strong
argument to be made that, absent an express Congressional directive to
the contrary, a federal court should only sparingly enter orders based on
federal law which-as in the case of executive removal and suspension-
directly interfere with matters of corporate governance. Such orders may
reach results inconsistent with those intended by the state law framers9 3
and tend to usurp the power of state courts to set their own standards in
corporate law cases. 94
(2) Suspension of corporate executives is inconsistent with the pri-
mary goal of the securities laws, which is full and fair disclosure to inves-
tors,9 5 and with the existing means of promoting that goal. If a corporate
executive, or one seeking election to a directoral position, has engaged in
misconduct material to the job held or being sought, the regulations gov-
erning proxy solicitation already require disclosure of this information,
ensuring that shareholders can exercise an informed choice. A violation
of federal law aimed at the protection of shareholders is material to any
executive position and has been specifically identified by the SEC as
among the items which must be disclosed to the shareholders in the an-
nual proxy statement. 96
Under the existing federal statutory plan, however, shareholders are
not entitled to any more than a fully-informed opportunity to select their
own fiduciaries. The SEC exceeds its authority when it importunes a
90 Id.
91 E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1988) (expressly protecting only state Blue Sky laws and then only
to the extent they do not "conflict with the provisions of this title or the rules and regulations
thereunder").
92 E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-I (1988) (prohibiting use of mails for making "corrupt" foreign pay-
ments). See also Steinberg, The Securities and Exchange Commission 's Administrative, Enforcement, and Legis-
lative Programs and Policies - Their Influence on Corporate Internal Affairs, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 173
(1982) (noting that many activities of the SEC have a substantial, though indirect, impact on corpo-
rations' internal affairs).
93 For example, some states have declined to permit the removal of directors through a judicial
proceeding, but have limited the format for removal exclusively to the vote of the shareholders or
directors. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (1988).
94 Cf. Codos v. National Diagnostic Corp., 711 F. Supp. 75, 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (federal court
declines to hear petition seeking dissolution of corporation, because "the exercise of federal jurisdic-
tion 'would in effect permit the possibility of federal dissolution actions based on [state dissolution]
statutes, being commenced in a number of different districts in which a particular [state] corporation
was subject to service, thereby placing an onerous burden on the corporation' ").
95 Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (1977) (the securities laws are, at best, tan-
gentially concerned with fairness to the shareholders; rather their purpose is to ensure full
disclosure).
96 E.g., Schedule 14A, incorporating by reference Regulation S-K Item 401 (requiring identifica-
tion of all nominees for directorships and other executive officers and disclosure of their involve-
ment within the past five years in enumerated legal proceedings, including injunction actions
brought by the SEC. Any court finding, not subsequently reversed, that the nominee or executive
officer has violated state or federal securities or commodities laws must be disclosed. Item 401 (f)(5)
and (6)).
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court to remove and suspend an executive, rather than seeking to ensure
that the executive makes appropriate disclosure in the next proxy solici-
tation or, at best, a special report to shareholders. Moreover, a district
court which gives shareholders "more" than that to which they are enti-
tled, in the form of a removal and suspension order, not only encourages
the Commission's overreaching, but may in fact deprecate the
mandatory disclosure system. Shareholders in a system which permits
such orders may lose their incentive to scrutinize the disclosures related
to management integrity and cease monitoring the conduct of their of-
ficers and directors.
(3) Court-ordered removal and suspension orders usurp the con-
tractual suffrage rights of shareholders without due process to the share-
holders.97  When purchasing stock, corporate shareholders acquire
various contractual rights, including the right to approve or disapprove
of certain fundamental transactions,9 8 to amend the corporate charter 99
and to elect and remove directors.' 00 While these rights have been said
not to constitute "vested property rights,"'' 1 they are nevertheless
"property,"10 2 and in any event are the sort of expectations which ought
not be abrogated without an opportunity for the shareholders to be
heard. '0 3
(4) Forced removal of corporate exec utives is inconsistent with the
well-established (though frequently challenged)104 notion that judges are
ill-suited to evaluate managerial competence. The very basis of the busi-
ness judgment rule is the belief that corporate executives haye particular-
ized expertise in dealing with business risks which judges do not
share.' 0 5 To encourage judges, rather than shareholders, to decide when
97 See Dent, supra note 56, at 934-35 ("[T]he shareholders' franchise is usually eliminated with-
out any meaningful representation of shareholders in the judicial proceeding. In theory, corporate
management represents shareholder interests. In practice, the managers lose little by surrendering
the shareholders' franchise, and in so doing they may placate the SEC and avoid litigation that might
do the managers greater personal harm. In theory, the SEC also represents shareholder interests.
Its approval of, and indeed its fond wish for, decrees eliminating shareholder rights belies the
theory.").
98 Ek.g., REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 11.03 (1984) (shareholders must approve mergers or
share exchanges).
99 E.g., id. § 10.03 (shareholders must approve significant amendments to articles of
incorporation).
100 E.g., id. § 8.03 (directors are to be elected by the shareholders); id. § 8.08 (directors may be
removed by shareholders).
101 Id. § 10.01(b).
102 Cf. U.S. v. Local 560 of International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267, 281-82 (3d
Cir. 1985) (union member's right to elect the men "who will represent him in dealing with his eco-
nomic security and collective bargaining where that right exists by virtue of express contract" is
"property" which may be extorted in violation of the Hobbs Act), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1740 (1986).
103 Cf. Chernin v Lyng, 874 F.2d 501 (8th Cir. 1989) (an employee whose employer is required to
fire him as a condition of the employer receiving meat inspection services" is entitled to some due
process before losing his job, even though his employment is at-will.).
Shareholders' rights may also be impaired in bankruptcy. In bankruptcy reorganization pro-
ceedings, however, shareholders are entitled to seek representation on a security holders' commit-
tee, 11 U.S.C. § I 102(a)(2) (1988), and frequently play an active role in the formulation of the
reorganization plan. See generally Gerber, Comnmentazy, The Election of Directors and Chapter 11, 53
BROOKLYN L. REV. 295 (1987).
104 Cf. Bartholet, Application of Title II to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARv. L. REV. 945, 979-80 (1982).
105 D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF COR-
PORATE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS, at 6-7 and notes 20-22 (2d. ed. 1988).
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a director or officer lacks the skill or character to continue in his or her
role, not only disregards the democratic nature of the corporate entity,
but also places the decision in the hands of the very persons who profess
incompetence to make it.
(5) In the absence of statutory authorization, the mere fact that a
removal and suspension order may be an effective deterrent, or even that
courts have routinely approved such orders in consensual settlements in
other SEC-initiated proceedings, does not mean that it is a lawful one.
Consent orders, to a greater or lesser degree, are always economically
coerced.' 0 6 Therefore, they cannot be relied upon to fairly reflect what
the law might permit or require were a dispute to be fully litigated to its
conclusion. Moreover, the mere fact that the SEC has gone unchal-
lenged in its repeated usage of an implied remedy is not probative of that
remedy's validity.10 7
What is really at issue is whether Congress intended that the statu-
tory injunction power granted to the SEC in sections 20(b) of the Securi-
ties Act and 21 (d) of the Exchange Act' 0 8 would extend to the limits now
claimed by the Commission's enforcement staff. There is ample evidence
that Congress did not intend such an extension.
Express statutory authorization for courts to enter executive bar and
suspension orders such as that sought in The Remedies Act would obvi-
ate some of these criticisms. Courts have upheld statutorily-authorized
corporation-specific removal and suspension orders in other contexts.10
However, even though expressly authorized, court-imposed removal and
suspension orders against corporate executives may still reasonably be
subject to criticism.
C. Why Congressionally-Authorized Removal and Suspension
Orders May be Unwise
There is nothing inherently "wrong" and certainly nothing uncon-
stitutional, in the notion that a court, even in a civil case, may deprive a
defendant of his means of livelihood. The constitution does not guaran-
tee that a person can have the job of his choice, or even work in the
profession of his choice. While the "right to practice one's profession is
... precious," 0 it is by no means inviolate, as may be seen in any regu-
lated profession for which barriers to entry have been established and
upheld, or in any case in which a professional's license is revoked."' All
106 Dent, supra note 56, at 948-49; Cf. Chernin, 874 F.2d at 503 (corporation felt compelled to
terminate executive's employment in order to receive USDA meat inspection services, after three
months of sustaining "considerable losses" due to lack of such services).
107 Conpare SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978) (SEC not empowered to "tack" or serially issue
10-day trading suspensions, when statute only permits one 10-day order. This is so notwithstanding
numerous prior instances of unchallenged "tacked" suspension orders).
108 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
109 Cf. United States v. Local 560 of International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267 (3d
Cir. 1985) (approving removal of union local's executive committee, in light of express authorization
in 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a)), cerl denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
110 Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners, 68 Cal. 2d 67, 64 Cal. Rptr. 785, 435 P.2d 553 (1968).
111 See generally W.O. MORRIS, REVOCATION OF PROFESSIONAL LICENSES BY GOVERNMENTAL AGEN-
CIES (1984).
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that is ensured is that a person may not be barred by the government
from his work for reasons that are arbitrary and capricious" 12 and that he
cannot be separated by the government from his livelihood without due
process.' 13
There continue, however, to be some serious policy-based problems
with the notion that a corporation-specific removal and suspension order
is an appropriate sanction against a person found in a civil proceeding to
have violated the federal securities law, even if Congress sees fit to au-
thorize such an order. Certainly the issues discussed above-interfer-
ence with corporate internal affairs, denigration of the disclosure ideal,
judicial competence and the usurpation of shareholders' suffrage
rights-do not disappear just because Congress authorizes the SEC to
seek an additional remedy to those already authorized. In addition, one
may reasonably object to the use of removal and suspension orders as a
prophylactic tool, particularly where the suspension may be lengthy or
indefinite in term. Such orders, even within a single corporation, are
likely to be overbroad as a form of equitable relief.
Just as licensing agencies may not impose qualifications which are
"unreasonable, unduly oppressive or patently beyond the necessities of
the case," ' 14 neither should courts be quick to impose injunctive restric-
tions on a person's ability to practice his trade which are not reasonably
necessary to prevent predictable unlawful conduct. The fact that courts
have routinely entered overbroad injunctions in cases in which violations
of the securities laws have been found-for example, several courts have
entered broadside injunctions perpetually prohibiting any and all viola-
tions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts' ' 5 -is no defense to such a limitation.
For an injunction to be entered, there is supposed to be some "cog-
nizable danger" of recurring violation or specific misconduct." 6 Injunc-
tive relief is inappropriate where it is imposed solely "to prevent the
possible occurrence of an event at some indefinite future time."" 7
Rather, in SEC cases as in any injunctive case, the Commission must
112 FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230,-, 108 S. Ct. 1780, 1787 (1988) ("[a bank official's] interest in
the right to continue to serve as president of the bank and to participate in the conduct of its affairs is
a property right protected by the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.... [T]he FDIC cannot
arbitrarily interfere with [the official's] continuing employment relationship with the bank .... ).
113 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959) ("...the right to hold specific private employ-
ment and to follow a chosen profession free from unreasonable governmental interference comes
within the 'liberty' and 'property' concepts of the Fifth Amendment.. ."); Chernin v. Lyng, 874 F.2d
501, 505 (8th Cir. 1989).
114 Gambone v. Commonwealth, 375 Pa. 547, 551, 101 A.2d 634, 637 (1954) ("Under the guise
of protecting the public interests the legislature may not arbitrarily interfere with private business or
impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations.").
115 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. Such "obey the law" injunctions are by definition
overbroad, and ought not survive appellate review or support a contempt citation. Meyer v. Brown
& Root Constr. Co., 661 F.2d 369, 373 (5th Cir. Nov. 1981); Russel C. House Transfer & Storage
Co. v. United States, 189 F.2d 349, 351 (5th Cir. 1951). See also National Labor Relations Bd. v.
Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426 (1941) (NLRB cannot use defendant's refusal to bargain as a
basis for an order enjoining all unrelated unfair labor practices).
116 United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953).
117 Janowski v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 710 Pension Fund, 673 F.2d 931,
940 (7th Cir. 1982), varated on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1222 (1983) (issue of attorney's fees); see also
Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 674 (1931) (An injunction "will not be granted against
something merely feared as liable to occur at some indefinite time in the future.").
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show that "there is a reasonable likelihood that the wrong will be re-
peated." i1s Merely showing that the defendant has, violated the securi-
ties laws in the past is not enough to support the imposition of an
injunction. 19 Nor, logically, should it be enough to merely show that the
defendant executive will be returning to the scene of his or her prior
misconduct, absent other clear indicia of likely recidivism.i 20
Extrapolating from these well-accepted maxims, few if any long-term
or permanent injunctions would make sense, which is not an argument
necessary to the point advanced here. Courts have accepted the notion
that certain behavior is predictive of future misconduct.' 2 1 However, it
should be the rare case where a court finds sufficient evidence to support
a lifetime or extended-term corporation-specific disqualification order
rather than a suspension or cooling-off period of limited and finite dura-
tion. '-2 (Such cases might include instances of repeated and clandestine
misconduct such as occurred in the Florafax case,i 23 especially where the
defendants have a prior history of similar securities law violations in
other companies. 124)
Given that vacation or modification of permanent injunctions is so
difficult to achieve, even where the defendant's post-order behavior has
been exemplary, 125 and given that the impact of the permanent injunc-
tion may burden not only the defendant but also innocent shareholders
and others, 26 an extended-term or lifetime disqualification order should
118 SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100 (2d Cir. 1972), quoted in Aaron v.
SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 703 (1980) (Burger, C.J., concurring). Cf. United States Steel Corp. v. United
Mine Workers of Am., 534 F.2d 1063, 1077 (3d Cir. 1976) ("Before prospective injunctive relief is
ordered the district court must, we think, make specific findings based on evidence in the record as
to the types of violations which have occurred in the past and limit injunctive relief to the likelihood
of their recurrence, or to new and different kinds of violations which may be expected to occur in the
future. The court must, moreover, relate the likelihood of recurrence or occurrence to some act,
omission or responsibility of each defendant against whom such injunctive relief is ordered.").
119 Aaron, 446 U.S. at 701. See generally Steinberg, SEC and Other Permanent Injunctions-Standards
for Their Imposition, .Mtodification, and Dissolution, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 27, 32-39 (1980).
120 Cf. Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254, 270 (E.D. La. 1967) (" 'Opportunity to
do wrong and a suspicion that wrong will be done is not enough to warrant action by a court to
prevent such wrong.' "). See also Steinberg, supa note 119. at 33.
121 Cf. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 (1983) (evidence of defendant's "future dangerous-
ness" is admissible in support of plea for death penalty).
122 Cf. Farrand, supra note 56, at 1812 ("ITIhe accuracy of predictions based on current and past
circumstances diminishes when applied to distant future events. Indeed, when projected far enough
into the future, the probability that a company currently involved in securities law violations will
thereafter engage in similar transgressions or that a loss of the company's assets will be threatened is
indistinguishable from the corresponding probability for any other existing company. It follows that
no showing of reasonable necessity can be made for the extension of ancillary orders into the indefi-
nite future, and that, on theoretical grounds, cut-off dates should be set for all but self-liquidating
forms of relief.").
123 See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text. The SEC's allegations included claims that
Florafax systematically inflated its quarterly sales figures by shipping unordered products just before
the close of the quarter and withheld material information from its accountants. SEC Lit. Rel.
10,617 (N.D. Okla. 1984).
124 Prior to the Florafax proceedings, defendant Hale (Florafax's Chief Executive Officer) had
been convicted of securities laws violations and had been enjoined in a civil proceeding in connec-
tion with another enterprise. United States v. Hale, SEC Lit. Rel. 10,635 (N.D. Ga. 1984); SEC v.
World-Wide Coin Inv's, Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724 (N.D. Ga. 1983), aff'd, 774 F.2d 1172 (11th Cir.
1985).
125 See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
126 Steinberg, supra note 119, at 39.
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at best be sparingly sought and imposed. (Congress in other contexts
evidently has agreed that some reasonable limit on job disqualification is
appropriate. For example, it has limited the job disqualification period
for ERISA trustees and labor union officials who are convicted of afelony to
no more than 13 years.' 27 It is unlikely that a more extensive period of
disqualification would be necessary or appropriate where the defendant
has been found liable for a securities law violation in a civil case.)
A better approach would be to empower courts to enter corpora-
tion-specific suspension orders of finite duration, up to a congressio-
nally-determined maximum period of time. A suggested maximum for
this period is the ten year period for which a defendant may be impris-
oned or subject to probation when convicted of criminal violations of the
securities laws.'12 (Assuming the defendant were sentenced to probation
rather than imprisonment, and that one of the conditions of probation
was withdrawal from the firm or a promise not to work in certain jobs or
industries, 129 the maximum length of the disability would be the maxi-
mum term of confinement. 30 ) An alternative, but less desirable, maxi-
mum would be the one year to which the SEC is currently limited when it
suspends broker/dealers.13 l
There is another reason why corporation-specific removal and sus-
pension orders, even if authorized by Congress, and even if reasonable in
duration, may be unwise. Such orders may deprive shareholders of nec-
essary expertise in the governance of the companies in which they have
invested. Consider the executive who is found responsible for having
promulgated false financial statements for Company X. It might be rea-
sonable for a court to prohibit that executive from continuing to have
responsibility for Company X's financial reporting for some finite period
of time until better financial controls can be put in place. But it may be
entirely unreasonable to interdict her involvement in any aspect of the
corporation's management. For example, the executive may have unique
experience with respect to Company X's marketing strategy, product de-
sign or manufacturing processes. In this case, a court entering an order
precluding her from serving in any managerial capacity with Company X
not only would be unnecessary to protect Company X's investors, but
could affirmatively harm their best interests.
Injunctions are supposed to be carefully tailored so as not to unduly
inhibit the lawful activities of those enjoined. 3 2 Forcing executive resig-
nation and prohibiting the executive thereafter from serving as an officer
of a particular company-even one with no financial reporting responsi-
bilities-may exceed the bounds of what is reasonably necessary to up-
hold the federal securities laws. It may also encourage subterfuge. For
example, assume once again that the executive of Company X is enjoined
127 29 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. V 1987); 29 U.S.C. § I111 (Supp. V 1987).
128 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1988).
129 See hira note 263 and accompanying text.
130 See supra note 80.
131 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (1988).
132 Gemveto Jewelry Co. v. Jeff Cooper, Inc., 800 F.2d 256, 259 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Society for
Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1251 (2d Cir. 1984).
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from serving as an officer or director of that company for a period of ten
years. What is to stop that executive from assuming a new job title such
as "sales manager" or "shipping clerk" but continuing to exercise pre-
cisely the same responsibilities which got her into trouble in the first
place? Unlike other statutes which authorize executive removal and sus-
pension, The Remedies Act does not contemplate any prohibition other
than service as a titled officer or director. 133
One could argue in a contempt citation that the court should look to
the substance and not to the title of the position. 34 One could as easily
argue that contempt only extends to the specific prohibitions of the in-
junction. 135 But because it places talismanic reliance on an executive's
job title, rather than on a functional evaluation of the role he or she plays
within the organization, The Remedies Act encourages the entry of in-
junctive orders which may be overinclusive (and harmful to the share-
holders) or underinclusive (and harmful to the shareholders). A better
approach would be to authorize a court specifically to enjoin enumerated
types of work which may facilitate renewed securities laws violations,
such as: (1) assuming responsibility for a corporation's financial account-
ing and reporting functions, (2) assuming responsibility for communica-
tions with investors or prospective investors or (3) (most broadly)
assuming responsibility for any aspect of corporate funding.
Given that courts, based on the existing authority of sections 20 of
the 1933 Act and 21 (d) of the Exchange Act, can already enjoin defend-
ants from committing future violations of the securities laws,136 it is diffi-
cult to see what is added by the proposed power to strip an executive of
the opportunity to perform his job or related functions in a lawful man-
ner. But enforcement officials agree that the removal and suspension
power is an important tool; therefore, we will turn to the arguments
133 Compare 12 U.S.C. § 181 8 (g)(1) (1988) (upon a finding that a bank director or officer has been
indicted in connection with a crime involving dishonesty or breach of trust, FDIC may suspend him
from office or prohibit him from "further participation in any manner in the conduct of the affairs of
the bank.").
134 Courts have, in the context of Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act (which governs officers, directors
and 10% beneficial owners of public companies), engaged in a functional analysis to determine that
persons with non-officerial titles are nevertheless in fact "officers" for purposes of the securities
laws. E.g., Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1949) ("production manager" could be treated as
an officer if his duties were "of such character that he would be likely, in discharging those duties, to
obtain confidential information about the company's affairs that would aid him if he engaged in
personal market transactions."). See also C.R.A. Realty Corp. v. Crotty, 878 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1989)
(employee's functions, not his title, are determinative); SEC v. Aaron, 605 F.2d 612, 617 (2d Cir.
1979), vacated sub nom., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) ("To permit the manage[rs of corpora-
tions] to avoid the consequences of their supervisory responsibilities and thus to escape injunctive
and other liability imposed upon them by the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws
merely because they lack corporate title, would create a peculiarly vacuous and pernicious
distinction.").
135 Cf. Ford v. Kammerer, 450 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1971) (defendant may not be held in contempt
for conduct not expressly prohibited in an injunction order, even where such conduct may have been
contemplated by the enjoining judge as the sort to be prohibited); Fujiwara v. Clark, 477 F. Supp.
809, 818 (D. Haw. 1979) ("Defendant may not be held in contempt for actions which were not
expressly written in the court order."). But see Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 278 F. Supp. 794, 803
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) ("[A] violation of an injunction may be found even if its 'strict letter' has been
complied with if, in fact, 'the spirit of the injunction' has been disregarded."); Folk v. Standard
Business Forms, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 147, 156 (W.D.N.C. 1967) (same).
136 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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which tend to support the enactment of this portion of The Remedies
Act.
D. Policy Arguments in Favor of the Corporation-Specific Removal and
Suspension Power
Notwithstanding the strong arguments in opposition to granting
federal district courts express authority to remove and suspend corpo-
rate officers and directors, three compelling arguments support enact-
ment of The Remedies Act, insofar as it would authorize courts to
remove and suspend for a finite period corporate executives found to
have engaged in misconduct within a specific company. First, granting the
SEC power to seek, in effect, removal of a corporate executive for cause
will give it parity of remedies with the shareholders on whose behalf the
action is taken. That is, if a shareholder were to bring a derivative action
against a corporate executive for mismanagement, which includes
chronic disregard of the federal securities laws, he or she (at least in
some states) could elect to include a claim for removal under state law. 3 7
When the SEC, rather than a shareholder, takes action under federal law,
acting, in effect in parens patriae, it should be able to secure the same relief
as the shareholder could, where necessary to protect investors. It should
not be necessary for a shareholder to bring a separate and subsequent
action to achieve removal, especially in situations where the
nondefendant shareholders are essentially passive investors. This is a
matter of simple judicial efficiency, and is wholly consistent with the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure and their emphasis upon ease ofjoinder of
parties and claims. Nor should it be necessary for the SEC to locate and
join a token shareholder as a plaintiff in its injunctive action solely for the
purpose of achieving standing on the removal claim. The SEC already
has standing to seek an order requiring resolicitation of proxies 3 1 or
appropriate filings of Schedule 13D139 and to seek an order prohibiting
controlling shareholders from transferring their securities,140 where nec-
essary to protect investors. There is nothing inappropriate about grant-
ing the SEC standing to seek removal to serve the same end.' 4 '
Second, encouraging executive removal and suspension where ap-
propriate in ajudicial forum recognizes the fact that an electoral forum is
137 Such claims are rare in the absence of statutory authorization. Dent, supra note 56, at 933-34.
However, many states provide such authorization in their business corporation statutes. A typical
example permits judicial removal of a director where the director has "engaged in fraudulent or
dishonest conduct, or gross abuse of authority or discretion, with respect to the corporation ..
REv. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 8.09 (1984).
138 SEC v. American Real Estate Inv. Trust, 529 F. Supp. 1300 (C.D. Cal. 1982); SEC v. May, 134
F. Supp. 247, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), aft'd, 229 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1956); SEC v. O'Hara Re-Election
Comm., 28 F. Supp. 523, 525 (D. Mass. 1939).
139 SEC v. General Refractories Co., 400 F. Supp. 1248, 1261 (D.D.C. 1975).
140 Id.
141 It would perhaps be desirable, however, to require that notice be given to shareholders of the
fact that removal is being sought, to enable them to object if they so choose. This process, similar to
giving notice to shareholders of a proposed settlement of a class action, would satisfy the due pro-
cess concerns discussed above. See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
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a particularly cumbersome setting for such decision making,' 42 and that
shareholders rarely vote against incumbent management in proxy voting,
even where one of their number is willing to undertake the costs of a
challenge. 143 If grounds for "for cause" removal are advanced, it is bet-
ter that they be identified and adjudicated in a setting where due process
considerations vis-a-vis the defendant can be maximized and the expen-
diture of investor resources minimized.
Third, removal without some additional period of suspension may
not be a sufficient safeguard against the recurrence of misconduct within
the very corporate culture which fostered it initially. It is entirely appro-
priate that removal be coupled with a finite and reasonable "cooling off
period" during which both the corporate culture and the executive's
frame of mind may be altered so as to preclude or inhibit future miscon-
duct. 144 In aid of this notion, the court, by way of additional ancillary
relief, may enter orders appointing a special auditor or special counsel to
oversee and monitor the specific reconstruction of those aspects of the
corporation's organization which gave rise to the initial misconduct.
The basic point of The Remedies Act is to permit and encourage
federal district courts to consider and employ a broad range of options in
crafting injunctive relief which is appropriate to the defendant's wrong
and effective as a means of deterring future securities law violations. 145
The alternatives to enactment of a limited removal and suspension power
are increased regulatory surveillance at a time of limited regulatory re-
sources, 14 6 or increased use of the criminal process at a time when
prosecutorial resources ought better be directed toward the eradication
of drugs and guns, or at least toward high-profile securities-related
crimes (such as insider trading and stock manipulation), the prosecution
of which is thought to have a strong deterrent effect, as well as a salutary
effect on the capital markets.
The idea of providing district courts with discretionary authority to
enter a well-crafted order enjoining a corporate executive from resuming
his or herjob (or serving in functionally-related positions) in an environ-
ment where the evidence demonstrates a likelihood of recurring harm,
142 E.g., Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d 852 (1957) (submission to share-
holders of issue of"for cause" removal of a director requires "substantial safeguards" and an oppor-
tunity for the director to present his case).
143 One can count on his fingers the number of times that a shareholder-initiated proposal has
passed. In 1988, shareholders of Santa Fe Southern Pacific Corp. voted to roll back the company's
poison pill. During the 1989 proxy season, shareholder proposals on the same issue barely passed at
Avon Products and Consolidated Freightways, while scores of other shareholder proposals, includ-
ing several on poison pills and dozens on confidential proxy voting failed by wide margins. Share-
holders Score flictories Against Poison Pills, Greenniail, V IRRC Corporate Governance Bulletin No. 3 at 50
(May/June, 1988); Votes on 1989 Poison Pill Shaeholder Proposals (chart), VI IRRC Corporate Govern-
ance Bulletin No. 3 at 67 (May/June 1989).
144 The drafters of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act agree. In that Act, where a court
has ordered the removal of a corporate director for cause, it may also "bar the director from reelec-
tion for a period prescribed by the court." REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.09(b) (1984).
145 135 CONG. REC. S3045 (daily ed. March 17, 1989) (statement of Sen. Dodd) ("[The Act] is
designed to . . .enable the Commission to tailor enforcement remedies more appropriate[ly for
particular facts and defendants.").
146 E.g., Sontag, 'Desperate' SEC Seeks More Aid, 11 NAT'L. L.J., May 1, 1989, at I, col. 4; Smart &
Zigas, Wl'atchdog Iloes: Up Against it at the SEC, Bus. WK., 120 (Oct. 10, 1988).
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makes sense as a tool of law enforcement, so long as that order is nar-
rowly drawn and of reasonable duration (or can easily be vacated upon a
showing of changed circumstances). 147 When the SEC can demonstrate
an appropriate level of likely recurrence of illegal activity-especially the
type of behavior (such as false financial reporting) which is harmful to
existing and continuing investors-the "cost" to shareholders of such an
order (in terms of lost suffrage rights) and the arguable usurpation of
states' rights which may result are outweighed by considerations of pro-
phylaxis and, frankly, expedience.
II. The Comprehensive Bar to Executive Status
There are, under both federal and state law, numerous ex ante
prohibitions against individuals serving as corporate officers or directors,
premised not on personal misconduct but rather on categorical assump-
tions about fitness for service. The Clayton Act prohibits persons from
serving on the boards of competing corporations. 148 The Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935 prohibits directors or executive officers of
any bank from simultaneously serving as a director or officer of a regis-
tered public utility holding company.' 49 Certain persons affiliated with
securities underwriters cannot serve as bank directors 150 and, where their
dual service is detected, quite apart from any allegation of managerial
misconduct, they may be summarily removed from office.' 5 '
There is a second type of prohibition which is based on prior mis-
conduct, but that misconduct is or may be wholly unrelated to the con-
templated employment. For example, absent a statutorily-authorized
waiver, "no person shall serve as a director, officer, or employee of an
insured bank who has been convicted ... of any criminal offense involv-
ing dishonesty or a breach of trust."' 5 2 Absent a statutorily-authorized
release from the disability, persons who have been convicted of enumer-
ated felonies may not serve as officers, directors or decisionmakers in a
labor organization, 153 or as officers, trustees or employees of any em-
ployee benefit plan 54 for a period of 13 years following conviction. 155
147 See hfra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
148 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1988). The Depository Institution Management Interlocks Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 3202 (1988) similarly interdicts management officials of federal depository institutions from serv-
ing in the same capacity with any other depository institution within a single metropolitan statistical
area.
149 15 U.S.C. § 79q(c) (1988).
150 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1988).
151 Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441 (1947). By the same token,
no registered investment company shall have a majority of its board of directors consisting of per-
sons who are officers, directors, or employees of any one bank. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(c) (1988).
152 12 U.S.C. § 1829 (1988).
153 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
154 29 U.S.C. § I I I (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
155 In addition to direct sanctions against executives in certain industries, Congress has imposed
indirect sanctions against corporations whose executives have engaged in misconduct. For example,
the government may refuse food inspection services to any entity whose officer or director has been
convicted of violating the pure food laws or any other law "indicating a lack of the integrity needed
for the conduct of operations affecting the public health," 21 U.S.C. § 1047 (1982) or to any estab-
lishment in which "anyone responsibly connected with" its governance has been convicted of any
felony. 21 U.S.C. § 671(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
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Persons convicted of any felony under the securities laws cannot serve in
any significant role with an investment company for 10 years. 156
All of these statutory prohibitions are forms of a "comprehensive
bar," in which employers are foreclosed from considering certain per-
sons for director or officer (or other fiduciary) positions, and those per-
sons subject to the statutory restrictions are categorically excluded from
service not only with the entity with which they have had a prior relation-
ship, but also in the entire universe of other entities subject to the bar. 157
In recent years, the SEC has sought to achieve a comparable comprehen-
sive bar of certain miscreant corporate executives without reference to
any statutory authorization. In a number of litigated cases, the SEC, in-
voking its inherent power to seek ancillary relief, has negotiated consen-
sual comprehensive suspension and bar orders.158 In addition, in at least
156 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(a) (1988).
157 There are analogies in the public sector. A person convicted of interfering with military mo-
rale is ineligible for employment by the United States, or any department or agency thereof, for five
years following conviction. 18 U.S.C. § 2387 (1982). A custodian of public documents who destroys
or mutilates same, or any person convicted of treason, is disqualified from holding "any office under
the United States," presumably for life. 18 U.S.C. § 2071 (1982); 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1982).
158 SEC v. Charles W. Anshen, SEC Lit. Rel. 11,618 (D. Nev. 1987) (defendant is barred, for a
period of five years, from holding the position of an officer or director of a public company); SEC v.
Wallace C. Sparkman, et al., SEC Lit. Rel. 11,532 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (defendant barred from serving
as either a director or officer of a public company for four years); SEC v. Gulf Resources, Inc., SEC
Lit. Rel. 10,291 (N.D. Tex. 1984) (defendant prohibited from becoming or acting as an officer, direc-
tor or control person of any public company absent Commission permission); SEC v. Frederic P.
DeVeau, SEC Lit. Rel. 9842 (W.D. Tex. 1982) (defendant barred from association as an officer,
director, control person or consultant to any company whose securities are publicly owned until he
satisfies a disgorgement order and thereafter only upon notice to the Commission); SEC v. Jack M.
Catain, SEC Lit. Rel. 9129 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (defendant is barred from serving as an officer or direc-
tor of a public company absent court approval); SEC v. Sheldon L. Hart, SEC Lit. Rel. 9080 (D.D.C.
1980) (defendant is barred from being a director or, under certain circumstances, an officer, of a
public company, unless that company has and maintains an Audit Committee of the board); SEC v.
Starr Broadcasting Group, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. 8667 (D.D.C. 1979) (defendant barred from seeking or
accepting employment as a director or officer of a publicly-traded commission for three years); SEC
v. Steven G. Weil, SEC Lit. Rel. 8719 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (defendant barred from assuming a position
as an officer or director of any publicly traded issuer); SEC v. L-S-K Corp. of America, SEC Lit. Rel.
8505 (D.D.C. 1978) (defendants enjoined from serving as officers, directors or employees of any
public company which has not adopted and maintained procedures to prevent violations of the fed-
eral securities laws); SEC v. American Guaranty Corp., SEC Lit. Rel. 8443 (D. Mass 1978) (defendant
may not serve as officer or director of any public company for three years); SEC v. Basic Food Indus-
tries, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. 8440 (D.D.C. 1978) (defendant enjoined from serving as an officer, director,
employee or consultant of any public company for nine months); SEC v. Aminex Resources Corp.,
[1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,458 (May 24, 1978) (defendants prohibited
from serving as officers or directors of any public company without court approval); SEC v. Cosmo-
politan Investors Funding Co., SEC Lit. Rel. 8419 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (defendant is prohibited from
assuming a position as either an officer or director of any public company except upon approval of
the court); SEC v. Continental Advisors, SEC Lit. Rel. 8257 (D.D.C. 1978) (defendant enjoined from
any further association as an officer, director or employee of any public REIT); SEC v. Inflight Serv-
ices, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. 8182 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (defendant enjoined from serving as an officer or
director of any public company until July 31, 1980); SEC v. Micro-Therapeutics, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel.
8072 (D.D.C. 1977) (defendant prohibited from assuming a position as either an officer or director
of any public company); SEC v. Wills, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,102 (June 22, 1977) (defendant may not serve as officer or director of any public company until
he has completed a program of education of at least 40 hours relating to the legal responsibilities of
corporate executives); SEC v. Timkin, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,703 (Aug. 21 1976) (defendant may not be associated as an officer or director with any public
company for two years); SEC v. Emersons Ltd., SEC Lit. Rel. 7392 (D.D.C. 1976) (defendant en-
joined from serving as an officer or director of any public company, absent prior consent of the
Commission and leave of court); SEC v. Cosmopolitan Investors Funding Co., SEC Lit. Rel. 7366
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one case, In re GEICO,' 59 the SEC has issued its own comprehensive sus-"
pension order against an executive in a compliance proceeding under
Section 15(c)(4) of the 1934 Act.'6 0
The comprehensive suspension or bar such as that coveted by the
SEC (call it an executive blacklist or the "Scarlet Letter" of securities law
enforcement) may be characterized as an effective means of deterring
misconduct short of incapacitation under the criminal law.16' That is,
where the evidence may not be sufficient to convict a corporate fiduciary
(for example, under the securities laws, conviction requires proof of a
"willful" violation 162) or to support an extended jail term, it may be suffi-
cient to support a finding of civil liability. If the court in such instances
can then be persuaded to impose a comprehensive suspension or bar as
an element of ancillary relief, then much of the power of a criminal sanc-
tion can be replicated at a lower cost to the government (both in terms of
manpower resources and the burden of proof which the government
must meet) than it would incur in the criminal context. 163 The costs are
even lower when such orders can be entered administratively.
Other law enforcement agencies recognize the value of the compre-
hensive suspension or bar. Like the SEC, the Department of Labor has
sought comprehensive suspension and bar orders against fiduciaries in
civil proceedings in its capacity as the enforcement agency overseeing
ERISA. (Unlike the SEC, the DOL has been able to secure non-consen-
sual removal, suspension and bar orders. 64 In part, this may be because
(M.D. Pa. 1976) (defendant may not assume position as an officer or director of any public company
except upon approval of the court); SEC v. Arnold Nelson, SEC Lit. Rel. 7215 (E.D.N.Y. 1975)
(defendant is barred from directly or indirectly associating with any public company); SEC v. Techni-
Culture, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,501 (April 2, 1974) (de-
fendant prohibited from serving as an officer or director of any public company except upon ap-
proval of the court); SEC v. Westgate-California Corp., SEC Lit. Rel. 6142 (S.D. Cal. 1973)
(defendants required to resign as officers and/or directors of any public company).
159 In re GEICO, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 95,750 (Oct. 27, 1976).
160 In this case, defendants agreed to refrain from accepting employment as an officer and direc-
tor of any publicly-held company for a period of three years absent prior approval by the Commis-
sion staff.
161 Cf. United States v. Lundy, SEC Lit. Rel. 8554 (D.R.I. 1978) (as part of plea agreement in a
criminal case, defendant consents to order barring him from participating in the securities business
or participating as an officer or director of a public company for 10 years). See also infra note 263.
162 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1988). Apparently, proof of willfulness is not all that difficult to adduce.
United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1370-71 (2d Cir. 1978) (proof of specific intent to defraud
is not required), rev'd on other grounds, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
163 Note that criminal proceedings must be brought by the Department ofJustice, with the assist-
ance of the SEC, a fact which necessarily increases the cost of such actions.
164 E.g., Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 281 (2d Cir.) (district court did not abuse its discretion
when it removed trustees who had engaged in "repeated or substantial violations" of their fiduciary
duties), cerl. denied, Cody v. Donovan, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984); McLaughlin v. Rowley, 698 F. Supp.
1333 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (trustees enjoined from serving as fiduciaries of any ERISA plan for five
years); Donovan v. Bryans, 566 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (defendants enjoined from serving as
fiduciaries of any ERISA plan for five years); Marshall v. Mercer, 4 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA)
1523, 1536 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (defendant permanently enjoined from serving as fiduciary of the plan
which is the subject of litigation and from serving any other plan for a period of five years), revsd on
other grounds, Donovan v. Mercer, 747 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1984); Marshall v. Carroll, 2 Employee
Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2491, 2500 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 485 F. Supp.
629, 644 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (defendant is enjoined from serving in any fiduciary capacity with respect
to any ERISA plan).
The DOL has also succeeded in securing plan-specific injunctions. E.g., Marshall v. Kelly, 465
F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (defendant is removed as trustee until he has fully repaid sums
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the legislative history of ERISA contemplates more expansive authority
in the DOL to seek injunctive relief than does the legislative history of
the securities acts.)165
The targets of the comprehensive bar are understood to be those
executives, like Hale in the Florafax case 166 or Yetman in SEC v. Tim-
kin,16 7 who have had a history of other securities law violations.168 These
are the chronic recidivists, to whom sequential injunctions or even crimi-
nal prosecution has proven to be an inadequate deterrent. (One might
well ask if they are willing to disregard injunctions against specific mis-
conduct under the securities law then why are they more likely to honor
an injunction against their serving as a corporate officer or director. 169
The answer is that such service will inevitably be detected in the annual
reports filed by public companies with the Commission.)
In addition to the problems presented by the corporation-specific
removal and suspension power-intrusion into corporate internal affairs,
undermining of the mandatory disclosure system, problems of duration
and nomenclature and the like-there are several additional significant
issues surrounding the comprehensive suspension and bar powers pro-
posed in The Remedies Act which merit discussion. 70 The first distin-
guishes the comprehensive bar as it applies to some regulated profession
(such as the practice of law or the brokerage industry) from the compre-
hensive bar sought by the SEC and authorized in The Remedies Act,
misappropriated). See also Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1237 (9th Cir. 1983) (district court
did not abuse its discretion in appointing investment manager to assume control over pension fund
assets for 10 years while trustees retain other functions), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984).
165 H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws
4639, 4655; S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws
4890, 4989 (the Secretary is to have the "full range of legal and equitable remedies," including
injunctions to prevent future violations and removal of fiduciaries for "repeated or substantial"
violations.).
166 See supra notes 64-66, 123-24 and accompanying text.
167 SEC v. Timkin, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95, 703 (Aug. 21,
1976).
168 In Timkin, the company's controlling shareholder, Yetman, had previously been involved in a
corporation whose registration statement was subject to a stop order for failure to make adequate
disclosure (In re First Dyna Ray Exploration Fund - 1969, SEC Sec. Act. Rel. 5023 (1969)), and in a
company whose trading in the over-the-counter market had been suspended. SEC Exchange Act
Rel. 8565 (1969). He had been the object of an injunction requiring the filing of corrected financial
statements with respect to a different company, SEC Lit. Rel. 2984 (1964) and had pled guilty to a
charge of perjury before the SEC in an investigation of yet another company with which he was
affiliated. SEC Lit. Rel. 2004 (1961).
169 Securities professionals barred from the brokerage industry have been known to disregard
such orders. See Salwen, SEC Tries to Keep Up One Man s Bar From Securities Industry, Wall. St. J., July
14, 1989, at CI, col. 3 (broker barred by the SEC in 1975 found to have "blatantly shook off the
agency's barring order").
170 Other issues have been disposed of. For example, a ban on employment premised upon a
prior judicial finding is not a bill of attainder, nor does it violate the constitutional proscription
against ex post facto laws. DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960) (upholding the New York
Waterfront Commission Act which prohibits convicted felons from collecting dues from longshore-
men, effectively precluding them from serving as union officers); Postma v. International Brother-
hood of Teamsters Local 294, 337 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1964) (upholding 29 U.S.C. § 504, providing
for disqualification of convicted felons from holding union office). Prohibiting fiduciaries from re-
suming a fiduciary role following a criminal conviction is not an unreasonable exercise of the police
power. Presser v. Brennan, 389 F. Supp. 808, 814 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (upholding 29 U.S.C. § 1111,
providing for disqualification of persons convicted of certain crimes from serving as trustees of em-
ployee benefit plans.).
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which would apply to officers and directors in all "public companies."
These companies are wholly unregulated by the SEC, except insofar as
they are subject to financial disclosure obligations, and, until now, the
SEC has never purported to have authority to engage in "merit regula-
tion" of the selection or retention of their corporate managers.
The second issue distinguishes the types of comprehensive bar evi-
denced in existing statutes, which categorically exclude all persons meet-
ing (or failing to meet) certain standards from consideration for
enumerated managerial positions, from the authority sought in The
Remedies Act, which would permit but not require a court to impose a
comprehensive bar on some but not all defendants found to have vio-
lated the securities laws. A related issue relates to the way in which a
defendant may be released from the disability. At least one court has rec-
ognized that a lifetime ban on certain types of employment is a "radical
measure,"'' and that is especially so where, as in The Remedies Act,
there is no articulated means of achieving redemption.
Other considerations counsel against the comprehensive bar. Cer-
tainly, the comprehensive bar impairs the suffrage rights of shareholders,
as discussed above,' 72 except that its impact encompasses not only the
shareholders of the corporation in which misconduct occurred, but
shareholders of all public companies. Also, the comprehensive bar is in-
evitably overbroad, certainly as a matter of the law of injunctions and
perhaps even as a matter of constitutional law.
A. Corporate Executives as an Unlicensed, Unregulated Profession
It is well established that, in the exercise of their police powers,
states may articulate minimum standards for entry into and retention
within a profession, and that failure to comply with articulated standards
may result in license suspension or revocation. 73 The federal govern-
ment also has authority to "license" and therefore to suspend or revoke
the licenses of, certain professionals, and the SEC, for example, has done
so in many instances. Broker/dealers have been suspended or barred in
SEC enforcement proceedings under Section 15(b)(4) of the Exchange
Act; 174 investment advisers have been suspended or barred under the
171 United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1977) (court declines to impose a permanent
ban on criminal defendant's reacquisition of union office), vacated, 439 U.S. 810 (1978), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 864 (1979).
172 See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
173 See generally W.O. MORRIS, REVOCATION OF PROFESSIONAL LICENSES BY GOVERNMENTAL AGEN-
CIES (1984).
174 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (1988). E.g., Svalberg v. SEC, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,458
(D.C. Cir. May 26, 1989) (brokerage firm principals permanently barred from serving as principals in
any NASD member firm); Berdahl v. SEC, 572 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1978) (salesman barred from
association with any broker or dealer, provided that he could reapply to the SEC for permission to
become associated with a broker or dealer in a non-supervisory capacity, after nine months); Quinn
& Co. v. SEC, 452 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1971) (securities salesman suspended for 20 days), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 957 (1972); Vanasco v. SEC, 395 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1968) ("boiler room" salesman barred
from any employment in the securities field); In re James E. Simpson, SEC Exchange Act Rel. 26,847
(May 22, 1989) (defendant permanently barred from association with any broker, dealer, investment
company, investment adviser or municipal securities dealer); In re Michael J. Boylan, SEC Exchange
Act Rel. 18,378 (December 30, 1981) (officer of broker/dealer firm suspended for 90 days); In re
Michael Batterman, SEC Exchange Act Rel. 12,278 (November 2, 1976) (defendant is barred from
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Investment Advisers Act;' 75 and mutual fund managers have been sus-
pended or barred under the Investment Companies Act. 176 Account-
ants 77 and lawyers' 78 who appear before the SEC have been suspended
or barred administratively under SEC Rule 2(e) of the Commission's
Rules of Practice. ' 7 9
Unlike these professionals, however, corporate directors and officers
are not subject to licensure and license revocation, either on the ground
(as in the case of broker/dealers, investment advisers and mutual fund
managers) that they do not comply with articulated standards for practic-
ing their profession, or (as in the case of accountants and lawyers) that
their conduct is disruptive of the ongoing operations of the SEC.
There are no articulated standards for the types of persons who may
serve as the directors of public companies. Unlike lawyers, physicians,
podiatrists, architects, insurance agents, accountants, pharmacists or fu-
neral directors, all of whom may be excluded or removed from their pro-
any association with any registered broker, dealer, investment company or investment adviser, but
after two years may become so associated in a non-supervisory capacity); In re Carrol P. Teig, SEC
Exchange Act Rel. 12,812 (September 17, 1976) (defendant barred for four months); In re Cotzin,
Woolf & Co., SEC Exchange Act Rel. 11,769 (October 24, 1975) (partner in broker/dealer firm
barred indefinitely); II re Goffe-Carkener-Blackford Securities Corp., SEC Exchange Act Rel. 11,690
(September 29, 1975) (president of broker/dealer barred indefinitely); II re Paul L. Rice, SEC Ex-
change Act Rel. 11,667 (September 22, 1975) (securities salesman suspended for 30 days).
175 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e) (1988). E.g., Marketlines, Inc. v. SEC, 384 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1967) (in-
vestment adviser's registration revoked), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 947 (1968); In re The Geier Letter,
Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 80,098 (Jan. 27, 1975) (defendant
permanently barred from affiliation with an investment adviser); In )e Shortline Reports, Inc., [1970-
1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,962 (Feb. 22, 1971) (defendant suspended
from association with any investment adviser for six months).
176 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(b) (1988). E.g., In re Vanier, [1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 79,555 (Nov. 1, 1973) (defendant barred from any employment with an investment com-
pany, but may seek relief from this order after one year); In re Zieg, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,109 (Nov. 16, 1972) (defendant barred from any employment with an
investment company and must liquidate funds within 8 months).
177 E.g., In re Sheldon M. Blazar, Exchange Act Release No. 26,848, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
73,695 (May 22, 1989) (accountant denied privilege of practicing before the commission but may
perform limited work as a preparer or reviewer after one year); In re Richard P. Franke, Exchange
Act Release No. 26,662, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,689 (March 24, 1989) (accountant perma-
nently denied the privilege of appearing or practicing before the Commission); In re Edmond A.
Morrison, III, Exchange Act Release No. 26,567, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,685 (Feb. 23, 1989)
(accountant is denied the privilege of appearing or practicing before the Commission, but may seek
"readmission" in four years); In reJohn L. VanHorn. Exchange Act Release No. 26,238, 6 Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 73,678 (Nov. 1, 1988) (accountant may seek "readmission" after five years); In ie
Keith Bjelajac, Exchange Act Release No. 26,124, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,670 (Sept. 28,
1988) (accountant suspended for three years); In re John E. Harrington, Exchange Act Release No.
22,686, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (Dec. 5, 1985) (accountant is permanently
denied the privilege of appearing or practicing before the Commission).
178 E.g., In re Paul H. Metzinger, Exchange Act Release No. 26,640 (March 17, 1989) (attorney
denied privilege of appearing or practicing before the Commission for 36 months); In re Thomas W.
Tierney, Exchange Act Release No. 23,169 (1986) (attorney permanently denied the privilege of
appearing or practicing before the Commission but may seek "readmission" after three years); In re
Robert V. Gibson, Exchange Act Release No. 18,314, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 83,068 (Dec. 7, 1981) (attorney suspended from appearing or practicing before the Com-
mission for nine months); I re Paul H. Brumley, SEC Exchange Act Rel. 16,558 (1980) (attorney
permanently disqualified from appearing or practicing before the SEC); In re BernardJ. Coven, SEC
Exchange Act Rel. 16,448 (1979) (attorney suspended for three months); In re Richard D. Hodgin,
SEC Exchange Act Rel. 16,225 (1979) (attorney suspended for 12 months); II re Stephen R. Gilli-
land, SEC Exchange Act Rel. 16,046 (July 26, 1979) (attorney permanently disqualified).
179 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1988).
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fession for lack of expertise or specified acts of misconduct, corporate
directors and officers have no admission or performance standards save
those imposed by their shareholders.
State law generally provides that standards may be imposed, but only
on a corporation-by-corporation basis pursuant to the terms of a corpo-
ration's articles of incorporation or bylaws.180 Neither the states nor the
federal government has imposed on corporate executives, as they do on
professionals subject to licensure, educational requirements, residence
requirements, examination requirements or the posting of a bond.
Federal law does require that corporate officers and directors file pe-
riodic reports concerning their share ownership,' 8 ' and requires their
signatures on certain corporate documents. 8 2 Other than having to per-
form these essentially ministerial functions, however, and subject to gen-
eralized duties of care and loyalty, corporate officers and directors are
free to conduct themselves however they please so long as they enjoy the
confidence of their shareholders. Unlike in other professions where
there is some consensus, for example, that physicians should not be
felons (at least where their crimes bring the medical profession into dis-
repute 83), there is no comparable consensus as to corporate executives.
Thus, we find directors and officers being elected and reelected who have
been found guilty of personal or corporate tax evasion,' 8 4 assault, drunk
driving and other "personal" crimes, ' 8 5 and even forgery and embezzle-
ment from the company in question. 186
In this context, it is particularly troublesome to contemplate a court
determining on the basis of an executive's non-compliance with the law
while managing Corporation A (or even Corporations A, B, C, D and E),
that he or she is unsuitable to serve as an officer or director of Corpora-
tion X. Indeed, for some investors, the most desirable managers are
180 See REv. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 8.02 (1984) ("The articles of incorporation or bylaws
may prescribe qualifications for directors. A director need not be a resident of this state or a share-
holder of the corporation unless the articles of incorporation or bylaws so prescribe.").
181 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1988).
182 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a) (1988) (requiring officers and a majority of directors to sign registration
statement); SEC Form 10-K General Instruction D(2)(a) (requiring officers and a majority of regis-
trant's directors to sign Form 10-K).
183 E.g., Levy v.Board of Registration and Discipline in Medicine, 378 Mass. 519, 392 N.E.2d
1036 (1979) (physician's license revoked following conviction for grand larceny and submission of
false data to Rate Setting Commission). An argument can be made that any crime disables a physi-
cian from serving in the public interest. E.g., Raymond v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 387
Mass. 708, 443 N.E.2d 391 (1982) (physician's license revoked following conviction for selling guns).
184 See, e.g., Furman, Albert AVipon's in Basic Black Again-Dress Company Fashions a Turnaround,
CRAIN'S NEW YORK BUSINESS, November 4, 1988, at 3 (recounting triumphant return of Albert Ni-
pon as CEO of Albert Nipon, Inc., after a 20-month imprisonment for tax evasion); Mandell, The
Rubell ears, Newsday,July 27, 1989, at 8 (recounting the successful career of Steve Rubell following
his 13-month imprisonment for tax evasion. From being unable to get a credit card immediately
after his release in 1981, Rubell developed and became the head of a $180 million real estate
empire).
185 See P. COLLIER & D. HoRowrTz, THE FORDS: AN AMERICAN Epic at 382 (1987) (recounting the
well-publicized drunk driving arrest of Henry Ford II while he was head of Ford Motor Co.).
186 See D. MCCLINTOCK, INDECENT EXPOSURE (1982) (recounting ihe story of David Begelman who
was reinstated as President of Columbia Pictures, Inc. following disclosure that he had embezzled
tens of thousands of dollars from the company).
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those willing to take the greatest risks-including those willing to oper-
ate close to (or even over) the line of legality.
Congress could (but surely should not) set minimum standards for
executive service with a public company, or empower the SEC to adopt
its own standards. 87 One such standard might be the absence of any
criminal convictions, or the absence of any prior civil finding of a viola-
tion of the federal securities laws. Other democratic bodies have limits
on the types of people who may run for office,' 88 and certainly such pro-
visions as the Clayton Act' 8 9 and the prohibition against affiliates of se-
curities underwriters serving as bank directors, 90 are valid even though
they limit shareholders' choices. But in the absence of such standards, it
is difficult to see upon what principled basis a court would determine
when a comprehensive suspension or bar against future executive service
is warranted, especially where existing disclosure rules ensure that voting
shareholders will have adequate notice of the prior conduct of directoral
candidates before they are elected.19' (A somewhat more difficult prob-
lem may exist regarding corporate officers, whose selection is not directly
controlled by shareholders. But shareholders offended by the selection
of an unacceptable corporate president, for example, reserve the right to
vote against the board candidates responsible for the selection, or to sell
their interest. In either case, if shareholder resistance is sufficient, the
executive's selection will be reconsidered by those empowered to affirm
or revoke it.)
The Remedies Act provides no guidance as to the standards by
which executive "fitness" should be judged. Although the comprehen-
sive bar is said to be aimed at chronic violators, the statute does not say
so, as it could and does in RICO, 92 federal "career criminal" legisla-
tion l'9 3 and in typical state recidivist statutes. 94 Nor does the statute
contain any reference to the severity of the immediate offense (or the
scienter required therefore) to guide the district court in selecting the
option of a comprehensive bar. There are no behavioral standards (such
as cooperation with the government in securing corrective disclosure)
which might bear on the bar-or-no-bar determination.
187 In 1977, then-director of the Enforcement Division and now federal district judge Stanley
Sporkin advocated just such legislation. R. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUrION 196 (1982). It
had never been imagined that, in the absence of legislation, the SEC could adopt standards of con-
duct on its own. See In re Franchard, 42 S.E.C. 164, 176 (1964) ("The [Securities] Act does not
purport... to define federal standards of directors' responsibility in the ordinary operations of busi-
ness enterprises, and nowhere empowers us to formulate administratively such regulatory
standards.").
188 E.g., U.S. CONST., art. I, §§ 2, 3 (declaring minimum age and durational citizenship require-
ments for candidates for the House of Representatives and U.S. Senate).
189 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
190 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
191 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
192 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982) ("pattern of racketeering activity" rather than isolated acts of racke-
teering form the basis of criminal-and civil-liability).
193 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (provides for sentence enhancement for persons
with three previous convictions).
194 E.g., L.A. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:67 (West 1986) (provides for sentence enhancement for per-
sons with two prior convictions).
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Without reasonable standards, or the civil equivalent of "sentencing
guidelines," courts inevitably will engage in ad hoc and undisciplined de-
cision making, a process regularly and properly decried both by courts' 95
and by Congress.' 96
B. Predictability, Proportionality and Relieffrom the Bar
As noted, other federal laws specifically and categorically authorize a
comprehensive bar. That is, they announce in advance that certain forms
of conduct-for example, conduct leading to a criminal conviction for
one or more enumerated offenses-will result in disqualification from fu-
ture work, thereby enabling a corporate executive to make an informed ex
ante decision governing his or her behavior. These statutes are also nar-
row in their focus, prohibiting work only within defined industries, such
as banking, labor union management, stock brokerage or investment ad-
visory firms. Most of the statutes authorizing a comprehensive bar set a
maximum for the period of disability from work 197 and/or expressly pro-
vide for a means of lifting the disqualification upon some showing of
rehabilitation. 's
By contrast, The Remedies Act does none of these things. Because
it rests wholly on the discretion of the court, the Act affords a corporate
executive no certainty that a finding of civil liability will necessarily lead
to a suspension or bar order, leaving the executive no means of assessing
the risks of misconduct. The suspension order ultimately entered by the
court need not be limited in time or (as in the case of broker/dealers and
investment advisers) to a defined industry, but may apply to the entire
universe of public companies, thus substantially circumscribing the de-
fendant's employment options.' 99 Moreover (and unlike comparable or-
ders governing ERISA fiduciaries or labor union managers), a
comprehensive order under The Remedies Act may cover many posi-
tions having nothing to do with financial reporting or other functions
which are within the jurisdiction of the SEC. For example, a defendant
subject to a comprehensive bar presumably could not assume a job bear-
ing even the cosmetic title of "vice-president," such as those frequently
found in banking, financial services, 200 sales and advertising. 20 1 Nor
195 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (striking down Georgia's death penalty statute be-
cause it permitted the sentencing judge virtually unlimited discretion in deciding whether the death
penalty was appropriate).
196 S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 38, reppinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
3182, 3221 ("[E]very day Federal judges mete out an unjustifiably wide range ofsentences to offend-
ers with similar histories, convicted of similar crimes, committed under similar circumstances. One
offender may receive a sentence of probation, while another-convicted of the very same crime and
possessing a comparable criminal history-may be sentenced to a lengthy term of imprisonment.").
197 E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (13 years); 29 U.S.C. § 1111 (1982 & Supp. V
1987) (13 years); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(a)(1) (Supp. V 1987) (10 years).
198 See infra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
199 There are 14,620 public companies. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DIRECTORY OF
COMPANIES REQUIRED TO FILE ANNUAL REPORTS WITH THE SEC UNDER THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE
ACT OF 1934, (1988).
200 See Merrill Lynch v. Livingston, 566 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1978) (defendant, one of 48 account
executives with the title "vice president," had exactly the same duties after he was awarded the title
as he did before. "Livingston never attended, nor was he invited or permitted to attend, meetings of
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could she become the vice-president for manufacturing, human re-
sources, or governmental affairs of a public company. In short, a com-
prehensive bar, though easily establishing a bright line for law
enforcement officials, may be wholly disproportionate and inappropriate
to the defendant's conduct in a given case.
There is also the question of rehabilitation. Comparable statutes
often expressly define the circumstances in which a comprehensive bar
may be lifted. For example, a banking executive convicted of a requisite
crime may petition the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to con-
sent to a lifting of the statutory bar, permitting him or her to serve as an
officer, director or employee of an insured bank.20 2 A labor union official
or ERISA fiduciary convicted of a requisite crime may be barred from
employment with a labor union or an employee benefit plan for up to 13
years, but may during that period request the court to lift the statutory
bar upon an appropriate showing of rehabilitation. 20 3
The Remedies Act contains no specific means of lifting the bar, save
the general procedures involved in seeking relief from an injunction. The
Supreme Court has admonished that such relief will be granted only
upon a "clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen
conditions, ' ' 20 4 and as a practical matter, defendants in securities cases
have seldom succeeded in meeting this standard. (The SEC counsel re-
sponsible for defending actions seeking to lift injunctions resulting from
SEC-initiated lawsuits reports that the last time anyone was successful
against the Commission was in 1982.205) It is not enough for a defend-
ant to demonstrate that his life and goals have changed substantially or
that he has been rehabilitated. 20 6
the Board of Directors or the Executive Committee. He acquired no executive or policy making
duties.").
201 See Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 798 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1986) (title of "vice president" of
advertising agency found to be a mere "honorarium" carrying with it no managerial
responsibilities).
202 12 U.S.C. § 1829 (1988).
203 29 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. V 1987) (bar may be lifted where sentencing court (or where convic-
tion has been under state law, the U.S. District Court), after notice to the Department of Labor and
applicable prosecutors, finds that defendant's renewed service in a labor union would "not be con-
trary to the purposes of this chapter"); 29 U.S.C. § 1111 (Supp. V 1987) (bar may be lifted where the
sentencing court (or where conviction has been under state law, and the Justice Department so re-
quests, the U.S. District Court), after notice to the Department of Labor and applicable prosecutors,
finds that defendant's renewed service for an employee benefit plan would "not be contrary to the
purposes of this subchapter.").
204 United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932), cited with approval in SEC v. Blinder,
Robinson & Co., 855 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1172 (1989). For a compre-
hensive discussion of the standards which must be met by a defendant in order to alter the terms of
an outstanding injunction, particularly in the context of the securities laws, see Steinberg, supra note
119, at 51-58. Steinberg argues for a somewhat more flexible standard than that articulated in Swift.
See id. at 59-73.
205 Telephone interview with Benjamin Greenspoon, Associate General Counsel (May 25, 1989)
(citing SEC v. Crofters, Inc. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,018 (S.D.
Ohio 1982)). Defendants were also successful in lifting an injunction in SEC v. Warren, 583 F.2d
115 (3d Cir. 1978) and in modifying an injunction in SEC v. Holben, SEC Lit. Rel. 11952 (D. Col.
1988).
206 E.g., SEC v. Clifton, 540 F. Supp. 848 (D.D.C. 1982) (defendant fails to secure dissolution of
injunction after six years of compliance with its terms), aff'd, 700 F.2d 744 (D.C. Cir. 1983); SEC v.
Advance Growth Capital Corp., 539 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1976) (defendant fails to secure dissolution
after 26 months of "strict compliance" with the law); SEC v. Thermodynamics, Inc., 464 F.2d 457
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The result of the Act as written is that a wrongdoer may prefer the
"certainty" of a criminal prosecution to the "uncertainty" of a civil pro-
ceeding. In other words, even though a criminal proceeding presents the
theoretical risk of a $100,000 penalty and ten years in prison,20 7 the gov-
ernment can only secure this result by proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant's misconduct was "willful." By contrast, in a
civil proceeding, the government need only offer proof by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, and in many cases need not even show that the
violation involved scienter.208 But if successful, the government may effec-
tively bar the defendant for life from seeking significant employment in
any public company, notwithstanding any rehabilitation or change of val-
ues he may undergo. 20 9
There is nothing illegal about a system in which defendants might
prefer criminal prosecution to the risks of a civil action-inside traders
might well prefer to serve some jail time following a criminal action than
to disgorge their profits in a civil injunction proceeding-however, in
crafting remedies under the securities laws, one would hope that Con-
gress would encourage the rehabilitation of securities law violators by
enabling those who have abandoned wrongful conduct to seek and se-
cure good jobs, rather than discourage rehabilitation by authorizing a
comprehensive bar which is effectively irrevocable.
An instructive case is Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners210 in which a
New Mexico bar examination applicant disclosed that, prior to attending
law school, he had a history of using aliases, had been arrested several
times and had been a member of the Communist Party. Noting that over
fifteen years had passed since any of these events, and that ample evi-
dence existed concerning his current good moral character, the Court
found that New Mexico had denied the applicant's due process rights
when it excluded him from the bar because of his "record." 21 1 Any stat-
ute authorizing a comprehensive bar for securities law violators ought to
consider the possibility of similar life changes rather than assuming that a
person with a history of financial mismanagement is incapable of
change. 212
(10th Cir. 1972) (defendant fails to get injunction lifted notwithstanding five years of exemplary
behavior and a "change in facts and attitude"), cert. denied, Strawn v. SEC, 410 U.S. 927 (1973);
Walling v. Harnischfeger Corp., 242 F.2d 712 (7th Cir. 1975) (defendant fails to secure vacation
order notwithstanding 12 years of compliance with injunction's terms).
207 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1988).
208 Some securities law violations are strict liability offenses. See, e.g., Escott v. Barchris Constr.
Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (top level executives effectively denied a due diligence
defense in an action under § 11 of the 1933 Act).
209 Of course, the SEC reserves the right to pursue both civil and criminal sanctions for the same
act. However, the civil sanctions cannot be so great as to constitute an additional "punishment" for
the crime. United States v. Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 1902 (1989) ("We . . .hold that under the
Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may
not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly
be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution.").
210 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
211 Id. at 247.
212 The existence of multiple prior violations of the law may warrant a high standard of proof of
rehabilitation. See In re Application of K.B., 291 Md. 170, 178, 434 A.2d 541, 545 (1981) (" '[T]here
can be no doubt ... that thievery of a repetitive nature, as here, is usually indicative of a serious
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But under existing law, a showing comparable to that made in
Schware would not be sufficient to require dissolution of an injunction, 213
leaving the defendant, at best, to make the sort of due process argument
advanced in Schware. This kind of gauntlet is excessive as a means of
enforcing the securities laws.
C. The Right of Shareholders to Select Directors
Shareholders, like electors, are entitled to make bad decisions, and
to choose a wrongdoer to represent them even when others might disa-
gree with that choice.2 14 Just as "[a] fundamental principle of our repre-
sentative democracy is . .. 'that the people should choose whom they
please to govern them,' -215 a fundamental principle of corporate owner-
ship (however illusory it may sometimes seem in practice) 216 is that
shareholders should have the right to select whomever they wish as their
corporate fiduciaries, except where (as in the case of bank executives
convicted of certain felonies or of persons whose election would result in
interlocking directorates) Congress has determined that a limited class of
candidates poses a grave threat to other constituencies.
Many observers believe that the selection of directors should include
"outside" candidates as a means of ensuring diversity in subject matter
expertise and leadership skills, and that independence from in-house
management is a value to be prized in the assembly of a corporate
board. 217 But no law requires independence, 2 18 thus leaving the
choice-as it should be left-to the shareholders.
In advocating.passage of The Remedies Act, the SEC, once again, is
displaying its distrust of the shareholders it was created to serve. Per-
haps it has embraced the proposition that most shareholders are not ca-
pable of absorbing mandatory disclosure. 219 Perhaps its paternalism,
character flaw' and that 'in such cases, the evidence of rehabilitation must be entirely convincing
.... ") (citing In re Application of David H., 283 Md. 632, 640-41, 392 A.2d 83, 88 (1978)).
213 See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
214 Cf Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (Congress may not refuse to seat duly elected
member, notwithstanding his record of misconduct while in office).
215 Id. at 547.
216 Cf. E.J. EPSTEIN, WHO OWNS THE CORPORATION at 29 (1986) (In 1985, of 408 corporate pro-
posals intended to restrict contests for control (shark-repellent proposals), only nineteen were voted
down by the shareholders; in 1984, "out of some six thousand corporate elections of boards of
directors, only eight offered shareholders the possibility of voting for an alternate board of directors,
and in only three of these contests did the challenger manage to win control through proxy solicita-
tion.") Epstein argues that shareholder suffrage is a "myth" perpetuated primarily by marketers at
the New York Stock Exchange.
217 See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE:
RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 303(a) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982) ("Corporate law should
provide that at least a majority of the directors of a large publicly held corporation shall be free of
any significant relationships with the corporation's senior executives .... ").
218 An exception may be the Investment Company Act, which provides that "no registered invest-
ment company shall have a board of directors more than 60 per centum of the members of which are
persons who are interested persons of such registered company." 15 U.S.C. § 80A-10 (1988).
219 H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE - REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE at
14 (1979).
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thwarted in cases involving insider trading 220 and state anti-takeover stat-
utes, 22 1 has reemerged in this new form.
In any event, The Remedies Act authorizes courts, at the behest of
the SEC, to interfere in a very fundamental way with the right of share-
holders to choose their own fiduciaries. While this may not present a
first amendment issue, 222 it does cast the SEC into a curious and unfortu-
nate role.
D. The Inevitable Overbreadth of the Comprehensive Bar
The most significant flaw of the comprehensive bar is that it is, by
definition, overbroad as a matter of equity and even perhaps as a matter
of constitutional law. Injunctions are supposed to be crafted so as to
specify in reasonable detail that conduct which is prohibited. 223
"Although a trial court is given broad discretionary powers in shaping
equitable decrees, injunctive relief should be narrowly tailored to fit spe-
cific legal violations,"2 24 and injunctions "should be tailored to restrain
no more than what is reasonably required to accomplish its ends." 225
Thus, when an order is entered enjoining both lawful and unlawful
activities, it must be closely scrutinized, and where found to be over-
broad, recast.226 This suggests that a comprehensive bar which prohibits
the lawful as well as unlawful exercise of executive powers-particularly
executive powers over areas of corporate activity wholly unrelated to the
dissemination of financial information-is illegitimate.
With respect to the constitutional argument, it may be helpful to
consider an alternative form of the SEC's proposed comprehensive bar.
Assume that rather than granting unconstrained discretion to the district
courts to determine when a comprehensive bar is appropriate, The Rem-
edies Act provided that every person twice enjoined in proceedings
under the securities law would in the third instance be subject to the
220 E.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980) (securities laws do not ensure that
some traders will not enjoy an "unfair advantage" in the marketplace).
221 CTS Corp v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (securities laws do not protect inves-
tors from interference with the free transferability of shares).
222 Cf Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975) (right of Democratic Party members to select the
delegates of their choice to the national convention is protected by the first amendment right of
association).
223 FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d). Vague prohibitions against generalized misconduct are inappropriate.
SEC v. Savoy Industries, Inc., 665 F.2d 1310, 1318 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (that portion of injunction which
ordered defendant not to "engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person" stricken).
224 Gemveto Jewelry Co. v. Jeff Cooper Inc., 800 F.2d 256, 259 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citations
omitted).
225 Consolidation Coal Co. v. Disabled Miners, 442 F.2d 1261, 1267 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 911 (1971).
226 E.g., Spiegel v. City of Houston, 636 F.2d 997, 1002-03 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (preliminary
injunction which forbids good faith as well as bad faith law enforcement activities is overbroad and
must be reversed); United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 534 F.2d 1063 (3d Cir.
1976) (preliminary injunction which effectively prohibits any strike or work stoppage, and not just
those which are similar to union's prior pattern of contract violations, must be vacated as
overbroad).
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comprehensive bar. 22 7 This would obviate the problems discussed above
of a lack of standards for decision making and lack of predictability. 228
However, it would arguably create a law well beyond the limits of the
government's police powers:
To justify the State in . . . interposing its authority in behalf of the
public, it must appear.., that the means are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the
public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose
unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations.22 9
This is not just hoary rhetoric reminiscent of the era of substantive
due process. Laws which purport to establish qualifications for admis-
sion to a particular profession must be rationally related to the skills re-
quired for that profession. 230 Thus an applicant cannot be denied
admission to the bar because she is a resident alien rather than a U.S.
citizen,231 or a nonresident of the state, 232 or a homosexual 233 or a wo-
man.2 34 An applicant seeking appointment to the police or fire depart-
ment cannot be excluded solely because he fails to meet an arbitrary
height or weight requirement, when physical strength is the real charac-
teristic being sought. 23 5 Nor should it be appropriate for the govern-
ment to bar people from a wide range of employment opportunities for
noncriminal misconduct-even repeated misconduct-which is unrelated
to the position being sought.
Certainly, a state or the federal government could require that cor-
porate directors, like applicants for bar admission, demonstrate moral
fitness and intellectual capacity for the job. But Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners 236 teaches that it is not enough for the government to look to
an applicant's former arrest record to determine whether he is currently
fit for work in one of the professions. 23 7 Nor should it be acceptablefor
the government (as opposed to the corporation itself) to cite the existence
227 Such a statute would look like the banking statute which states "no person shall serve as a
director, officer or employee of an insured bank who has been convicted [of certain types of
crimes]." See supra note 152.
228 See supra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
229 Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894). See also Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 105 (1909)
("[I]f the statutes are arbitrary and unreasonable and beyond the necessities of the case; the courts
will declare their invalidity.").
230 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 ("A State can require high standards
of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant
to the bar, but any qualification must have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capac-
ity to practice law.").
231 In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
232 Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985).
233 In re Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners. 358 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1978).
234 Foltz v. Hoge, 54 Cal. 28, 35 (1879).
235 Craig v. County of Los Angeles, 626 F.2d 659, 667-68 (9th Cir. 1980), (employer fails to
demonstrate that height restrictions were "manifestly related" to employment by the sheriff's de-
pariment), cer. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981) Horace v. City of Pontiac, 624 F.2d 765, 767-769 (6th Cir.
1980) (there is no business necessity for a height requirement for police officers).
236 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
237 See supra notes 210- 1l and accompanying text.
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of prior securities law violations as the sole basis for excluding from con-
sideration qualified applicants for officer or director positions.
That a federal district judge, rather than Congress, makes the bar-
or-no-bar decision only makes the situation somewhat more palatable.
Assume the same defendant with the same history (two prior injunc-
tions). Assume that The Remedies Act has been enacted as introduced,
and thejudge, in an exercise of discretion, enters the comprehensive bar.
In so doing, she prohibits the defendant-perhaps for all time-from
seeking thousands of available job opportunities-most of them wholly
unrelated to the defendant's initial misconduct-merely because of the
title they bear. Such a result would suggest that a court under compara-
ble legislation could bar a union organizer found to have engaged re-
peatedly in unfair labor practices from ever seeking ajob as a bank teller;
or an air traffic controller found to have abused alcohol from ever seek-
ing a job as a meat inspector. The statute simply goes too far.
Just as criminal penalties must bear some reasonable relationship to
the nature and severity of the crime, 238 and penalties in disciplinary pro-
ceedings brought against professionals must bear some reasonable rela-
tionship to the nature and magnitude of their misconduct,239 remedies in
civil proceedings-in this case the imposition of an injunction prohibit-
ing future employment-must bear some reasonable relationship to the
defendant's wrongdoing.
There is one final reason why the comprehensive bar is undesirable.
A defendant who is subject to the bar is likely to seek either a nontitled
position in a public company240 or a titled position in a nonpublic com-
pany, where, in either case, his continuing misconduct, if it occurs, will
effectively escape the scrutiny of the SEC. If the goal of The Remedies
Act is to facilitate the protection of investors, driving defendants under-
ground would not seem to be the most effective approach.
III. Administrative Removal, Suspension and Bar
New and greater legal and policy problems are presented where the
locus of decision with respect to the suspension or disqualification of a
corporate executive rests not with the court but is proposed to lie with
the SEC itself. The Remedies Act authorizes the SEC to seek judicially-
imposed corporation-specific removal and suspension orders and com-
prehensive suspension or-bar orders applicable to all public companies.
In addition, The Remedies Act would ratify past SEC usage (i.e.,
GEICO 241) by expressly authorizing the SEC, in an in-house compliance
proceeding, to "prohibit, conditionally or unconditionally, either perma-
nently or for such period of time as it shall determine, any person found
238 In criminal cases, sentences which are "significantly disproportionate" to the crime commit-
ted violate the Eighth Amendment. Solem v., Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983).
239 E.g., O'Reilly v. Board of Medical Examiners, 66 Cal. 2d 381, 426 P.2d 167, 58 Cal. Rptr. 7
(1967) (court finds 90-day suspension of osteopath excessive on facts presented), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 944 (1968); Richardson v. Florida State Bd. of Dentistry, 326 So. 2d 231 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976) ("harsh penalty" not warranted by facts).
240 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
241 See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
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to have failed to comply, or to have been a cause of the failure to comply
[with registration or reporting requirements], from acting as an officer or
director of any [public company]." 242
The SEC currently has administrative enforcement powers under
section 15(c)(4) of the Exchange Act2 43 to compel compliance with vari-
ous reporting and operational provisions of the Act.24 4 Those powers
were recently expanded to permit administrative actions to be brought
not only against the primary (corporate) violator but also against "any
person who was the cause of [a] failure to comply" with the securities
laws. 24 5 In a compliance proceeding under this section, the SEC may
issue an order requiring such a person to comply with the law "upon
such terms and conditions and within such time as the Commission may
specify in such order." 246 The SEC's General Counsel has argued that
this language authorizes the SEC to impose its own removal and suspen-
sion orders, and even comprehensive bar orders, against corporate
executives. 247
Former Commissioner Treadway has taken the contrary position, ar-
guing that absent the sort of express authority embodied in The Reme-
dies Act, the SEC is not empowered to enter executive suspension or bar
orders. 248 The SEC's authority as an administrative agency is not as
broad as that of a court of equity. The scope of its orders do not extend
as far as inherent equity powers would .permit and must be limited by its
statutory empowerment. 249 By seeking enactment of a statute along the
lines of The Remedies Act, the SEC (if not its staff) seems to have acqui-
esced in the notion that it currently lacks the authority to comprehen-
sively bar executives on its own.
Assuming that The Remedies Act resolves the authority issue, the
question remains whether such authority in the hands of the SEC, as dis-
tinguished from the federal courts, is well-placed. A simple answer to
this question is that it would be foolish to require the SEC in every in-
stance where removal and suspension is appropriate, to undertake the
costs and delay of litigation, especially where the resources available to it
are so meager.2 50 Moreover, consigning suspension and bar decisions to
the Commission, rather than to diverse district courts, would facilitate
uniformity and some predictability in the entry of disqualification orders.
There are, however, other issues to be considered. There is first the
question of competence. Courts are accustomed, in both criminal (sen-
tencing, bail and "likelihood of flight" determinations) and civil (injunc-
242 H.R. 975, 101st. Cong., 1st Sess. § 201(2) (1989).
243 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(4) (1988).
244 See generally, McLucas & Romanowich, SEC Enforcement Proceedings 'nder Section 15(c)(4) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 41 Bus. LAw. 145 (1985).
245 Id. at 151.
246 15 U.S.C. 78o(c)(4) (1988).
247 See Note, The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984: Does the ITSA Authorize the SEC to Issue Adminis-
trative Bars?, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 993, 997 and n.17 (1985) (quoting a 1984 speech of the SEC
General Counsel to the effect that the 1984 amendment to § 15(c)(4) created authority in the SEC to
bar individuals from corporate offices and boards for violations of securities laws).
248 Id. at n.25.
249 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 207 (1947).
250 See supra note 146.
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tion) contexts, to considering whether a particular individual is more
likely than not to repeat a particular type of "bad act." By contrast, one
might argue that the SEC lacks this perspective. However, the SEC for
years has been making judgments about the risk of recidivism in discipli-
nary proceedings against the accountants and lawyers who practice
before it251 and has frequently considered the propriety of suspension or
bar orders against broker/dealers, 252 investment advisers, 253 mutual
fund managers 254 and (particularly applicable in the instant context) cor-
porate executives of regulated companies.2 55 Presumably the Commis-
sion would be no less capable of exercising such judgment when
considering the risks associated with other professionals accused of
misconduct.25 6
It is true that there has been substantial criticism of the Commis-
sion's exercise of its existing bar and suspension authority, focusing on
basic due process issues, the inadequacy of standards by which the "sanc-
tion or no sanction" decision is made and, in the case of disciplinary pro-
ceedings, an alleged lack of underlying statutory authority.2 57 But the
251 See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
252 See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
253 See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
254 See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
255 E.g., Dirks v. SEC, 802 F.2d 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (court upholds six-month suspension of
brokerage firm principal under the SIPA); Hinkle Northwest, Inc. v. SEC, 641 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir.
1981) (officer/directors of broker/dealer firm suspended for 12, 12 and three months, respectively);
A.J. White & Co. v. SEC, 556 F.2d 619 (Ist Cir. 1977) (president ofbroker/dealer firm permanently
barred from association with any such firm), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977); In re Langheinrich &
Fender, Inc., SEC Exchange Act Rel. 20,959 (May 14, 1984) (respondents barred from acting as a
principal, owner, officer or director of any broker or dealer, for 10 years); In reJ. Daniel Bell & Co.,
SEC Exchange Act Rel. 19,867 (June 13, 1983) (respondent suspended from any association with a
broker/dealer for 6 months and barred from acting as a principal, officer, director or owner of a
broker or dealer for 12 months); In re HaroldJunior Morris, SEC Exchange Act Rel. 19,805 (May 23,
1983) (respondent barred from serving as principal, officer or director of a broker or dealer for 12
months); In re William Lee Parks, SEC Exchange Act Rel. 18,112 (Sept. 22, 1981) (respondent
barred from acting as a principal, officer, director, owner or supervisory employee of a broker or
dealer for two years); In re Denise L. Stine, SEC Exchange Act Rel. 16,864 (June 2, 1980) (respon-
dent barred from acting as a principal, officer, director, owner or back office employee of a broker or
dealer); In re Paul Buchbaum, SEC Exchange Act Rel. 16,622 [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 82,474 (March 4, 1980) (respondent barred for 18 months); In re RichardJ.Joseph,
SEC Exchange Act Rel. 11,020 (September 23, 1974) (respondent suspended from association with
any broker/dealer, investment adviser, investment company or affiliate for 90 days, and barred
thereafter from any such association as an officer, director or owner).
256 As former Commissioner Treadway has stated, "[ilf one governmental remedy is to get the
bad people out [of broker/dealers and investment companies], then what's the basis for the distinc-
tion between those stockholders and stockholders of industrial companies. Are stockholders of in-
dustrial companies entitled to less protection?" SEC Should Have Power to Bar Executives for Securities
Violations supra note 2, at 1487.
257 See generally R. KARMEL, supra note 187, at 176-78 (arguing lack of authority for Rule 2(e), at
least insofar as it applies to lawyers); Lanzarone, Professional Discipline. Unfairness and Ineficienty in the
Administrative Process, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 818 (1983) (noting "unfairness" and "risk of prejudg-
ment" in permitting same agency to determine that reasonable grounds for censure exist and also to
decide whether censure is appropriate); Best, Shortcomings of Administrative AgenO
, 
Law'fer Discipline, 31
EMORY LJ. 535 (1982) (arguing that the grounds upon which the SEC may suspend lawyers practic-
ing before it are overbroad); Note, Disciplinary Proceedings Against Accountants: The Veedfor a .1lore Ascer-
taiable Improper Professional Conduct Standard in the SEC's Rule 2 (e), 53 FoRDHAM L. REv. 351 (1984)
(decrying vagueness of the standard upon which SEC suspends accountants). Recent constitutional
challenges to the SEC's enforcement powers over professionals have been unsuccessful. E.g., SEC v.
Blinder, Robinson & Co., 855 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1988) (civil enforcement actions by SEC do not
violate separation of powers principle), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1172 (1989); Blinder, Robinson & Co.
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fundamental competence of the SEC to consider suspension or bar or-
ders does not provide a serious objection to The Remedies Act.
There is a far more serious question of regulatory overreaching.
The Remedies Act would authorize the SEC to select certain corporate
executives and, following notice and opportunity for hearing, 258 to pro-
hibit them from ever again serving in any capacity as an officer or as a
director of a public company. Theoretically, at least, regulatory agencies
such as the SEC are permitted to regulate individual conduct; they are not
permitted to punish individual misconduct. Punishment is reserved for
the criminal justice system,2 59 and even though Congress may designate
a sanction a "civil penalty" or, as here, a "remedy," the statutory scheme
may not be "so punitive either in purpose or effect as to" render it a
"punishment" inappropriate outside of the context and special protec-
tions of a criminal trial. 260
Under the traditional test distinguishing regulation from punish-
ment, imposition of a comprehensive bar against executive employment
in any public company may well be considered a punishment. That test
considers:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint;
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment; whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter; whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment - retribution and deter-
rence; whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime;
whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected
is assignable for it; and whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned .... 261
The comprehensive bar is an affirmative disability prohibiting per-
sons subject to it from seeking jobs for which they are otherwise quali-
fied. Disqualification from employment has historically been regarded as
a punishment (or more precisely an alternative form of sentence) in crim-
inal proceedings. Following a conviction for fraud (or any offense not
punishable by death or life imprisonment which would include all the
penal provisions of the federal securities laws), a defendant may be
granted probation subject to reasonable restraints on his conduct.2 2
Courts have frequently conditioned the grant of probation on resigna-
tion from a particular corporate office or withdrawal from an entire line
of work.
2 6 3
v. SEC, 837 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (same, plus SEC administrative compliance proceedings do
not violate due process clause), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 177 (1988).
258 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (1988).
259 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 167 (1963).
260 U.S. v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980). However "only the clearest proof[may] suffice to
establish the unconstitutionality of a statute on such a ground." Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603,
617 (1960).
261 Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69.
262 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(e); 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982 & Supp. 1987), repealed by Sentencing Reform
Amendments Act of 1985. New guidelines for the grant of probation may be found in the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, § 5B 1.3.
263 E.g., United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1987) (probation conditioned upon de-
fendant not holding any union office or seeking union employment upheld); United States v. Brock-
way, 769 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1985) (probation conditioned upon defendant not serving as a law
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Like criminal penalties, imposition of a comprehensive bar promotes
the "traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence. ' 264
Unlike most criminal provisions, those sections of the Exchange Act
which may form the basis for an SEC-imposed comprehensive bar, sec-
tions 12, 13, 15(d) and 16(a), do not require a showing of scienter.265
However, the behavior for which the bar is available is a crime if shown
to have been undertaken willfully.2 66
The final criterion for determining whether a purported civil sanc-
tion is in fact a form of punishment is whether there is some purpose
other than punishment to which it is rationally connected and if so,
whether the sanction appears excessive for the stated purpose. The im-
position of civil fines may be a rational means of defraying the costs of
law enforcement. 267 Suspension of a governmentally-granted license
where it has been shown that the licensee has violated clearly defined
standards of conduct may be a rational means of ensuring public
safety.2 6 8 However, as we have noted, there are no clearly defined stan-
dards of conduct for corporate executives, nor is the SEC empowered to
grant or withdraw executive "licenses." Nonetheless, the suspension or
bar from some forms of employment of unregulated corporate executives,
no less so than in the case of the suspension or bar of regulated profes-
sionals, may be said to bear some rational relationship to "the public
interest. ' 269 However, the breadth of the sanction, including as it does a
prohibition against seeking all manner ofjobs quite unrelated to the con-
enforcement officer upheld); United States v. Alexander, 743 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1984) (probation
conditioned upon defendant not maintaining a proprietary interest in any scale business upheld);
United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1979) (probation conditioned upon defendant not
running for political office upheld); United States v. Villarin Gerena, 553 F.2d 723 (1st Cir. 1977)
(resignation from police force is proper condition of probation, notwithstanding that it will cause
family hardship); United States v. Kohlberg, 472 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1973) (probation conditioned
upon defendant's termination of his interest in an illegal pornographic company upheld); United
States v. Barrasso, 372 F.2d 136 (3d Cir. 1967) (per curiam) (probation may be conditioned upon
defendant's promise not to seek or accept employment by any labor union); Whaley v. United States,
324 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1963) (probation may be conditioned upon defendant refraining from engag-
ing in the repossession business), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 911 (.1964). But see United States v. Pastore,
537 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1976) (court may not condition probation on defendant's resignation from the
bar where state procedural rules govern disbarment).
264 It has been noted that virtually all civil penalties would satisfy this criterion. E.g., Roach v.
Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., 804 F.2d 1147, 1154-55 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1732
(1988).
265 E.g., SEC v. Goldfield Deep Mines Co., 758 F.2d 459, 467 (9th Cir. 1985) (good faith is not a
defense to claims of noncompliance with section 12); SEC v. Gulf& Western Industries, Inc., 502 F.
Supp. 343, 348 (D.D.C. 1980) (defendants cannot assert as a defense in a case brought under section
13(a) that they relied on past governmental acquiescence to certain accounting practices).
266 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
267 Gardner v. City of Columbus, 841 F.2d 1272 (6th Cir. 1988) (imposition of civil penalties for
parking violations helps pay the costs of regulating on-street parking, so it is not to be treated as a
criminal punishment).
268 E.g., Roach, 804 F.2d at 1154 (NTSB's suspension of defendant's commercial pilot's certificate
is rationally related to the public safety goals of the federal aviation regulations).
269 In the case of regulated professionals, revocation of their license to practice has been found
not to constitute a punishment. E.g., Blaise D'Antoni & Assoc. v. SEC, 289 F.2d 276, 277 (5th Cir.
1961) (revocation of broker's license is "not punitive"), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 899 (1961). See also SEC
v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40, 54 (7th Cir. 1972) ("The purpose ofinjunctive relief
is, after all, not to punish but to deter future violations .... ).
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cerns of the SEC, 270 is clearly excessive. Taken together, these elements
suggest that the administrative suspension or bar, rather than represent-
ing acceptable regulation, is an unacceptable punishment and should be
substantially reduced in its scope.
Even if the allocation of the suspension or bar power to the SEC
does not rise to the level of unconstitutionality, there is still the policy
question of whether such an allocation invites regulatory abuse. The
General Counsel of the SEC has suggested that this power, if granted by
Congress, would be used sparingly and "only in the most egregious
cases," 271 such as those involving recidivist offenders or those who
boldly disregard the law. 272 "IT]his isn't a tool that anybody envisions
using routinely. . .... Goelzer has said.2 73
However, the potential for abuse of the suspension or bar power is
substantial. Administrative agencies, like prosecutorial offices, have wide
prosecutorial discretion. 274 They are empowered to select among many
potential defendants, all of whom may appear to be equally subject to
sanction, and target only certain of those individuals for prosecution. 275
Only where that selection constitutes a "patent abuse of discretion," will
it be reviewable and courts have construed the "patent abuse" standard
to exclude most claims invoking it.276 Presumably, these guidelines
would apply equally to the decision to impose a statutory suspension or
bar under The Remedies Act as to the initial decision to seek compliance
under section 15(c)(4)(a). 277 Thus, the assurance of transient officials
that bar and suspension orders will not become the regulatory norm
rings quite hollow. 2 78
In addition, there is no requirement in the statute (nor is one im-
posed by common law) 279 that the SEC articulate any standards by which
it will determine when it is appropriate to impose a suspension or bar
order.280 Under traditional notions of injunctive relief, a court in an
SEC-initiated injunction action would not enter a suspension or bar or-
270 See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
271 Interview with Daniel Goelzer, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1177 (July 22, 1988).
272 In his testimony before Congress, Chairman Ruder assured his listeners that "the Commis-
sion would expect to follow its current policy of employing this remedy only in cases involving re-
peated violations of the securities laws or involving egregious conduct as a corporate official."
Statement of Chairman Ruder, supra note 1, at 28.
273 Interview, supra note 271, at 129.
274 See generally C. KoCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE 358-59 (1985).
275 Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 4 11, 413 (1958) (per curiam).
276 Supra note 274, at 362-66.
277 Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1140 (5th Cir. 1979), af'd, 450 U.S. 91 (1981) ("The fash-
ioning of an appropriate and reasonable remedy is for the Commission, not this court, and the
Commission's choice of sanction may be overturned only if it is found 'unwarranted in law or...
without justification in fact.' ").
278 Cf. R. KARMEL, supra note 187, at 88-89 (although generally an independent agency, the SEC
occasionally has targeted for investigation the "political enemies" of members of Congress).
279 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1947) (SEC's order against corporate managers
need not he preceded by adoption of any general rule or regulation)..
280 It is understood that the SEC must provide substantial justification for any suspension or bar
orders which it enters. Sleadinan, 603 F.2d at 1140 ("In our view ... permanent exclusion from the
industry is 'without justification in fact' unless the Commission specifically articulates compelling
reasons for such a sanction.").
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der absent some showing of likelihood of recurring misconduct. 28' No
comparable limitation burdens the SEC in The Remedies Act.2 82
The statute itself conditions administrative suspension and bar or-
ders only on a finding of noncompliance with certain registration and
reporting requirements 28 3 and a finding that the suspension or bar is "in
the public interest." (Comparable language appears in statutes authoriz-
ing the SEC to suspend or bar brokerage firm employees 284 and has been
upheld as against vagueness challenges. 285 ) However, there is no addi-
tional guidance for the Commission's use in distinguishing those wrong-
doers subject to the bar or suspension power and those more properly
subject to other, lesser sanctions. The only discussion of the types of
conduct which would support an order "in the public interest" appears
in that section of The Remedies Act having to do with monetary penal-
ties, 286 and does not address the question of executive bar or suspension.
Given this absence of guidelines, how would the Commission de-
cide, for example, whether to suspend or bar corporate executives who
had repeatedly overstated their company's sales and earnings, and then,
when corrective disclosure was imminent, sold their shares on inside in-
formation?287 Or whether to suspend or bar corporate executives who
created a partnership purporting to provide "executive search" services,
which then charged the corporation (of which they were CEO and CFO
respectively) $410,000 without performing any services, failing to main-
tain satisfactory accounting controls within the corporation itself and
having made numerous false disclosures to shareholders? 288
The SEC has been given broad discretion in other contexts to decide
which of many available sanctions is appropriate, 289 but presumably that
281 See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
282 Just as there appears to be no requirement that the SEC find some likelihood of continuing
wrongdoing before entering its suspension or bar order, there is also no assured means of lifting the
disability following the passage of time. We have previously discussed the problems presented
when there is no realistic opportunity for a defendant to demonstrate redemption. See supra notes
207-09 and accompanying text.
283 H.R. 975, 101st Cong., Ist Sess § 201 (1989).
284 The Securities Investor Protection Act provides that bar or suspension orders may only be
entered where "the Commission shall determine such bar or suspension to be in the public inter-
est." 15 U.S.C. § 78jij(b)(1988). The SEC may bar or suspend registered brokers or dealers only
where (1) there is a finding that the action is in the public interest and (2) the broker or dealer has
acted "willfully." 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(D) (1988).
285 Cf. Blinder Robinson & Co. v. SEC, 837 F.2d 1099, 1110-1111 and n.12 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 177 (1988).
286 H.R. 975, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. § 203(c) (1989).
287 These facts come from SEC v. Gross, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 674 (May 5, 1989) (de-
fendant executives agree to a consent injunction which includes a disgorgement order, but are not
suspended or barred from their positions).
288 These facts come from SEC v. William A. MacKay and Muncie A. Russell, SEC Lit Rel. 11,878
(D. D.C. 1988) (defendants settle litigation by agreeing to injunction prohibiting future violations of
the federal securities laws - no one is suspended or barred).
289 E.g., O'Leary v. SEC, 424 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (court upholds order barring securities
salesmen from any association with a broker or dealer, even though their wrongdoing was a first
offense); Norris & Hirshberg v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (court upholds order revoking
broker/dealer's license, even though conduct did not rise to level of common law fraud): Hughes v.
SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (court upholds order revoking broker/dealer's license even
though 120 out of 175 of defendant's clients filed amicus brief, asserting no dissatisfaction with her
work and court asserts it would do so "even if one, or none, of the particular clients here involved
19891
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
is because of the Commission's special expertise as it relates to the finan-
cial services industry and the fact that that industry is within the SEC's
specific jurisdiction. The Commission has no such special expertise
when it comes to the governance of businesses outside of the financial
services industry, and-save for reporting and filing requirements-no
jurisdiction over corporate executives.
Congress has never given the SEC-or any other governmental
body-direct authority to determine the competency of corporate man-
agers. If the SEC is now to be given that power and the power to perma-
nently bar corporate executives from any managerial capacity in public
companies, at the very least Congress should specify in plain language
the circumstances in which such a draconian "remedy" may be applied.
Better still, Congress should reject the idea of SEC competency testing
for corporate executives and instead increase the Commission's budget
so that it can more effectively enforce the laws already within its
jurisdiction. 290
IV. The Company Directors Disqualification Act of 1986
While the American experience with executive suspensions and bars
has been, as noted, quite haphazard, depending for the most part as it
has on implied powers to seek undefined judicial remedies and the jaw-
boning activities of the SEC, 290 the British experience has been quite dif-
ferent and more sharply focused. Beginning with the Companies Act of
1928, British courts have been empowered to disqualify corporate execu-
tives with both corporation-specific orders and comprehensive bars.2'9 2
At first, cause for disqualification was limited to personal bankruptcy and
conviction for fraud. In 1976, the Companies Act was expanded to in-
clude, as grounds for disqualification, not only fraud, but also "persistent
default in satisfying the reporting requirements of the Companies Acts,
and ... proven cases of improper, reckless, or incompetent management.
In addition, powers were taken to disqualify a person who had been a
director of companies which successively became insolvent." 2 -1 More-
over, under the Insolvency Act, directors could be disqualified for a mini-
mum of two-years service where their conduct was found to render them
"unfit to be concerned in the management of a company. '2 94
In 1986, the Companies Act was again amended by the Company
Directors Disqualification Act of 1986. Under the new provisions, which
consolidated in one place prior provisions of the Companies Act and re-
lated provisions of the Insolvency Act,
ha[d] been misled or ha[d] suffered injury."). See also Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir.
1979).
290 See e.g., SEC to Ask Congress for Legislation to Permit Creation of Advisers' SROs, 21 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 871 (June 16, 1989) (noting SEC's financial inability to continue to oversee activities of
investment advisers; thus requiring it to seek authority to create a member-funded self-regulatory
group).
291 See supra notes 69, 158 and accompanying text.
292 Leigh, Disqualification Oiders in Company and Insolvency Law, 7 COMPANY LAW. No. 5, 179 (1986).
293 Id. at 179.
294 Id. at 180.
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the court may disqualify on conviction for an indictable offence 'in
connection with the promotion, formation, management or liquidation
of a company.' It may disqualify if a person is persistently in default in
filing returns with the registrar of companies. It may disqualify if in
winding up it appears that a person is guilty of fraudulent trading or of
any fraud or breach of duty in relation to the company.
The court is obliged to disqualify a person who is or has been a director
of a company that has become insolvent, if it finds that his conduct as
director makes him "unfit to be concerned in the management of a com-
pany." There are also powers to disqualify in the public interest where
an inspector's report indicates that a person is "unfit to be concerned in
the management of a company," and where a person has been declared
liable to contribute because of participation in wrongful trading. Finally,
an undischarged bankrupt commits an offense if he takes part in manage-
ment. No disqualification order is required.295
A person disqualified under the Disqualification Act is prohibited
from serving as a director, liquidator, administrator, receiver or manager
of a company and also from taking part, directly or indirectly, in "the
promotion, formation or management of a company. ' 296 This latter pro-
vision, characterized as "devastatingly broad," 297 may preclude a person
from serving not only as an officer or director of a company, but also as a
junior administrator, an outside consultant or even as a voting share-
holder.298 Acting in a manner contrary to the disqualification order is a
criminal offense. 299
Disqualification orders have a maximum limit of fifteen years.300 A
disqualified person may, at any time during the life of the order, seek
relief from the court to assume a specific corporate office or perform a
specific task.a0'
Considerable ambiguity has arisen concerning the application of the
Disqualification Act. There is no consensus, for example, on the stan-
dard of proof applicable to the issue of "unfitness," 3 02 nor on the sorts of
conduct which constitute "unfitness." 3 03 There appears, however, to be
consensus on the propriety of disregarding the private model of corpo-
rate governance and granting instead sweeping judicial powers to inter-
fere with management selection and retention. At least one
commentator has noted:
[g]iven that disqualification orders have a prophylactic purpose, there
seems little reason not to disqualify for long periods persons who are
glaringly incompetent in the management of their companies. We
295 Hicks, .Mlaking and Resisting Disqualification Orders, 8 COMPANY LAW. No. 6, 243 (1987).
296 Id.
297 Id. at 244.
298 Id. at 245.
299 Id. at 243.
300 Id. at 245.
301 Id. at 246.
302 E.g., Dine, Disqualification Orders, 9 COMPANY LAw. No. 4, 97, 98 (1988).
303 Id. at 98-100.
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have long since abandoned the position that these are matters for the
shareholders alone. 30 4
It is interesting to note that even in a system which frankly adopts
the proposition that the government has a regulatory interest in the qual-
ity of corporate management, disqualification can only be decreed by a
court, after a full trial, whereas The Remedies Act proposes to give that
power to the SEC without any meaningful standards (even so little as
"incompetence" or "unfit[ness] to be concerned in the management of a
company") with which to make a decision as intrusive as the comprehen-
sive bar.
IV. The Better View of the Remedies Act
The Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989 would more
reasonably serve its intended goal of ridding the markets of persons in-
clined to disregard their fundamental disclosure obligations, if it focused
on entity-by-entity enforcement, rather than a comprehensive reordering
of the market for managerial labor.
A simple, but preferable alternative to the bill as written would pro-
vide as follows:
Section 20(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77t(b)) [and
subsection (d) of section 21 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
U.S.C. 78u(d))] is amended by inserting after the first sentence thereof
the following:
In any proceeding under this paragraph, the court may prohibit,
conditionally or unconditionally, singly or cumulatively, and for such
period of time as it shall determine necessary up to a maximum of ten
years, any person (1) who has previously been found guilty of a viola-
tion of [the securities laws] or who has previously been subject to an
injunction prohibiting violation of any provision of [the securities
laws] and (2) who is found in a separate and subsequent proceeding to
have wilfully violated any provision of this title or any rule or regula-
tion thereunder:
(a) from continuing to serve in the job in which he served at the time
of the violation, or in any functionally similar job;
(b) from seeking rehire in the job in which he served at the time of the
violation, or in any functionally similar job;
(c) from continuing in the employment of his current employer in any
capacity involving supervision over or substantial responsibility for the
employer's financial accounting or preparation of reports for inves-
tors; or
(d) from seeking employment with his current employer in any capac-
ity involving supervision over or substantial responsibility for the em-
ployer's financial accounting or preparation of reports for investors.
Any person subject to an order prohibiting conduct under this
section shall be entitled at any time following 180 days after entry of
the order, to seek dissolution or modification of the order and the
court shall grant such dissolution or modification if it finds that such
an order would not be contrary to the purposes of [the securities laws].
304 Leigh, supra note 292, at 183.
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V. Conclusion
A cynic might suggest that what the SEC is seeking in The Remedies
Act is to render the criminal justice system (or perhaps, more pointedly,
the office of the Attorney General of the United States) irrelevant to the
process of enforcing the securities laws, and to usurp for courts in civil,
rather than criminal cases, and ultimately for itself, the power to compel
a corporate executive to step down, or out of his or her profession.
While limited use of this power by a federal district court (in the
context of a corporation-specific removal and suspension order of finite
duration) may reflect sound public policy, unlimited exercise of the
power (such as the entry of any comprehensive suspension or bar order)
does not. Moreover, reallocating this power to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission and away from the courts would be unwise, and cre-
ate an undue power in the Commission which historically has regulated
the disclosure, but not the behavior, of corporate executives.
The Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989 is properly
intended to facilitate the enforcement of complex laws in a simple way.
However, it is more simplistic than simple, and its passage would ulti-
mately disserve its proponents at the SEC.
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